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Abstract
We study optimal non-linear contracts o¤ered by two rms competing for the exclusive services
of workers, who are privately informed about their ability and motivation. Firms di¤er in their
organizational form, and motivated workers are keen to be hired by the non-prot rm because they
adhere to its mission. If the for-prot rm has a competitive advantage over the non-prot rm, the
latter attracts fewer high-ability workers with respect to the former. Moreover, workers exert more
e¤ort at the for-prot than at the non-prot rm despite the latter distorts e¤ort levels upwards.
Finally, a wage penalty emerges for non-prot workers which is partly due to compensating e¤ects
(labor donations by motivated workers) and partly due to the negative selection of ability into the
non-prot rm. The opposite results hold when it is the non-prot rm that has a competitive
advantage.
JEL classication: D82, D86, J24, J31, M55.
Key-words: non-prot rms, multi-principals, intrinsic motivation, skills, bidimensional adverse
selection, wage di¤erential.
1 Introduction
According to data from the 2014 CEO Compensation Study, reported by Charity Navigator,1 there are
top executives of U.S. non-prot organizations whose annual compensation exceeds one million dollar.2
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, P.zza Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna (Italy). E-mail:
francesca.barigozzi@unibo.it
yDepartment of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna (Italy). E-mail: na-
dia.burani@unibo.it. Tel: +39 0512092642. Corresponding author.
1See Charity Navigator 2014 Charity CEO Compensation Studyat www.charitynavigator.org
2Among them, one can nd the President of Chicago University and the President and CEO of Shedd Aquarium in
Chicago or the President of the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai (N.Y.C.) or else the President of the Lincoln
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Considering the comments to these data that one can nd on the media, two di¤erent perspectives
emerge. On the one hand, there is wide consensus by the public that seven-gure salaries are excessive for
employees of non-prot organizations that receive private donations and, possibly, public funding. Thats
why, in various federal states such as New Jersey, New York, Florida and Massachusetts, there have been
recent proposals to introduce legislation that would cap top managerscompensations at non-prots.3
Indeed, if you are going to work at a non-prot, you should have as your primary motivation the public
good (...) and you would accept less compensation....4 On the other hand, some contributors claim that
just because someone works for a non-prot, doesnt necessarily mean theyre doing it for free.5 First
it is pointed out that most non-prots tend to pay less than for-prot businesses for similar competencies.
Moreover, it is highlighted that the non-prot organizations that pay the highest compensations are multi-
million dollar operations: leading one of them requires individuals that possess extensive management
expertise together with a thorough understanding of the issues that are unique to the non-prots mission.
Therefore, attracting and retaining that type of talent requires a competitive level of compensation as
dictated by the marketplace.6
Our analysis contributes to this debate, challenging the idea that non-prot employees, especially
at the top of the wage ladder, should be ready to accept low salaries. In particular, we show that the
competition between for-prot and non-prot organizations to attract the most talented workers, without
a priori knowing their skills, tends to drive all salaries up. We also analyse how this interacts with the
workerswillingness to donate part of their labor to non-prot organizations whose mission or goal they
adhere to.
There exists a well-established empirical evidence on compensating wage di¤erentials asserting that
di¤erences in wages across sectors or jobs are generated by di¤erences in job characteristics or attributes
for which heterogeneous workers have di¤erent willingnesses to pay. For instance, an earnings penalty
attributed to compensating factors has been documented for public rms as opposed to private ones and
for not-for-prot rms relative to for-prot organizations.7
Intrinsic motivation for being employed by non-prot or mission-oriented rms has often been viewed
as a possible source of compensating wage di¤erentials. This idea has been rst proposed by Handy and
Katz (1998) for non-prot vs for-prot managers, by Heyes (2005) in the health sector, and by Delfgaauw
Center for Performing Arts.
3These bills have not reached legislative approval yet.
4See:Is A One Million Dollar Nonprot CEO Salary As Bad As It Sounds, Forbes, January 23, 2013.
5See The Street: These 9 Nonprot Executives Made Over 1-Million Dollar, September 15, 2014.
6See the 2014 CEO Compensation Studyby Charity Navigator.
7For compensating wage di¤erentials see Rosen (1986). The case of public versus private rms has been studied by Disney
and Gosling (1998) and Melly (2005), among others. Lower average wages in not-for-prot rms relative to for-prot ones
have been found by Preston (1989), Gregg et al. (2011).
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and Dur (2007). Besley and Gathak (2005) consider in particular mission-oriented rms that operate
in specic sectors (education, health and defence) and produce collective goods. Bénabou and Tirole
(2010) highlight the role of rmscorporate social responsibility: some rms take employee-friendly or
environment-friendly actions, some employers are mindful of ethics, or they even have an investor-friendly
behavior (as ethical banks). All those organizations have in common the pursuit of a mission or goal that
is valuable for some workers, precisely those who share such objectives and who are characterized by non-
pecuniary motivations, together with the standard extrinsic incentives. The theoretical prediction is that
relatively low pay and weak monetary incentives endogenously emerge in jobs where intrinsic motivation
matters. Empirically, the so-called labor donative hypothesis as the determinant of compensating wage
di¤erentials (see Preston 1989) has been tested by Leete (2001) and Jones (2015), among others.
However, another strand of empirical work points out that the wage di¤erential might arise because
of a selection bias, given that a wage gap can also reect unobservable di¤erences in workers ability
across sectors or rms. See, for instance, Goddeeris (1988) for lawyers, Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999)
for hospitals, and also Hwang et al. (1992) and Gibbons and Katz (1992).
Therefore, an open question still remains. Suppose that a wage penalty for workers employed in
mission-oriented and non-prot sectors or rms is measured, although neither workersintrinsic motiva-
tion nor ability can be directly observed: then, wages can be lower either because of the lower reservation
wages of motivated workers or because of the lower productivity of workers self-selecting into such sectors
or rms (or because of a combination of these two e¤ects). In other words, when workersproductivity
and motivation are the workersprivate information, is it possible to disentangle the pure compensating
wage di¤erential from the selection e¤ect of ability?
To this respect, we extend the analysis of Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) that studies the sorting of workers,
who are heterogeneous in both their productivity and their public service motivation between the public
and the private sector. This paper assumes that workerscharacteristics are fully observable and that both
sectors are fully competitive. We rather reckon that asymmetric information about potential applicants
traits, coupled with strategic interaction among employers, that are willing to attract the most talented
and motivated workers, are key ingredients to model the situation we are interested in and to answer our
research question.
In our paper, we consider a labor market characterized by two rms, a mission-oriented or non-prot
rm and a standard for-prot rm.8 The two rms compete to attract workers who are heterogeneous
with respect to both their skills and their intrinsic motivation. These two characteristics are the workers
private information and are not correlated. In particular, workers can have either high or low ability,
8For expositional clarity, in the paper we consider the dichotomy non-prot vs for-prot but we consider the notions of
non-prot and mission-oriented as almost equivalent. With a slight abuse of termilogy, our model could also be well-suited
to study public vs private sector jobs and the wage di¤erentials therein.
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whereas motivation is continuously distributed in the unit interval. In order to elicit the applicants
private information, the two rms simultaneously o¤er screening contracts consisting in a non-linear
wage which depends on the observable e¤ort (task) level. Because of the strategic interaction between
the two rms, the workersoutside options are type-dependent and endogenous and thus the analysis of
a multi-principal framework with bidimensional screening is called for.
All workers experience a cost from e¤ort provision, which can di¤er across workers types but which
does not depend on the employers organizational form. Conversely, motivated workers care about the
mission pursued by the rm which employs them. More precisely, the payo¤ of motivated agents depends
on their own type but also on the organizational form of the rm hiring them. When motivated workers
are employed by the non-prot employer, they enjoy a non-monetary benet (which is unrelated to e¤ort
exertion or output produced) because they share their organizations mission or goal. Therefore, the
non-prot benets from being able to attract motivated applicants, whose reservation wage is low, but
this comes at the cost of having to sacrice some payo¤ to engage in socially worthwhile projects.
The two rms have di¤erent objective functions, because the for-prot rm strictly maximizes its
prots whereas the non-prot rm is assumed to face some constraints and is able to appropriate only a
fraction of its revenues. Moreover, the two rms also di¤er in their technologies, which are characterized
by di¤erent marginal products of labor, and in the prices they face on the nal product market. For
simplicity, we bunch all these sources of rmsheterogeneity into one single summary statistic, which is
the rms marginal revenue and we say that one rm has a competitive advantage over the other when its
marginal revenue is higher than the rivals. We allow the non-prot organization to have a competitive
advantage over the for-prot rm, despite its revenue constraints.
We are interested in the intensive rather than in the extensive margin: we focus on situations in
which, in equilibrium, both rms are active and are able to attract a positive share of workers of each
ability level.9 We characterize the optimal incentive schemes o¤ered by each rm, the sorting pattern of
workers into rms, and relate it not only to the sign but also to the composition of the wage di¤erential
(disentangling the labor donative form the selection e¤ect).
The optimal incentive contracts are based on workersability, whereas workersmotivation determines
the labor supply from applicants of each ability level facing each rm. Optimal contracts di¤er according
to how the di¤erence in rms marginal revenues relates to the di¤erence in workers skills. When
the di¤erence in marginal revenues is low compared to the heterogeneity in workersskills the following
happens: on the one hand, rms are very similar to each other and competition between them is erce; on
the other hand, skills are distantand this discourages mimicking between types with di¤erent abilities.
So, optimal allocations (e¤ort levels) are the e¢ cient ones. Conversely, when the di¤erence in marginal
9 Instead, we disregard the instances in which only one rm is able to hire all workers of given skills, because these cases
do not allow to examine the wage di¤erential between rms.
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revenues is high relative to the di¤erence in workers skills, the opposite occurs: competition between
rms is less relevant and types are su¢ ciently close to each other so that mimicking becomes attractive.
Therefore, internal incentive compatibility is the driving force in shaping optimal contracts and optimal
allocations are distorted away from the rst-best; in particular, the rm with a competitive disadvantage
distorts high-ability workerse¤ort upwards and, eventually, the low-ability workerse¤ort is distorted
downwards by the advantaged rm.
Moreover, the di¤erence in rms marginal revenues also determines the selection pattern of workers
to rms. We show that the selection e¤ect of ability is more pronounced under asymmetric information
about workersability than when ability is perfectly observable. In particular, the higher is the di¤erence
in rms marginal revenue, the higher is the share of high-ability workers and the lower is the share of
low-ability workers accepting employment at the rm with a competitive advantage. For instance, when
the non-prot organization has a competitive disadvantage, there exists negative selection of ability for
the non-prot rm, which increases with the asymmetry between the two rms and which is exacerbated
when incentive schemes are in place.
As for the wages o¤ered by the two rms, our model is su¢ ciently rich to accommodate for both wage
penalties and wage premia at the non-prot organization. We nd that, when the non-prot rm has a
competitive disadvantage, then a wage di¤erential emerges in that the total salary gained by non-prot
workers is lower than the salary that the same workers would gain if employed by the for-prot rm.
Such a wage penalty for non-prot workers is always associated with lower e¤ort provision. The result
that workers average ability is di¤erent across rms allows us to conclude that the earnings penalty
possibly experienced by workers in non-prots is due in part to a true compensating wage di¤erential
(the labor donative hypothesis) and is in part driven by negative selection with respect to ability.10 But
our model also predicts that a non-prot wage premium can arise when the non-prot organization has
a competitive advantage and when the positive selection e¤ect of ability is su¢ ciently strong as to o¤set
the labor donative e¤ect.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following subsection we describe the related
literature. In Section 2, we set up the model; in Section 3, as benchmark case, we present the equilibrium
when rms are perfectly informed about workersability. Section 4 introduces asymmetric information
about ability and describes the equilibrium screening strategies of the two rms; the optimal sorting of
workers into rms is considered together with the full characterization of the optimal contracts. Section
5 focuses on wage di¤erentials and, nally, Section 6 concludes.
10This fact is consistent with the empirical evidence on the public-private wage gap documented in Bargain and Melly
(2008) and with the for-prot vs non-prot wage di¤erences found by Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999), among others.
11This nding conrms the empirical results found by Preston (1988), Borjas et al. (1983) and James (2002), among
others.
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1.1 Related literature
Our work contributes to two di¤erent strands of literature: from an economic point of view, it adds to
the recent and rapidly growing literature on the self-selection of workers with intrinsic motivation into
di¤erent rms/sectors of the labor market; from a theoretical point of view, it explicitly solves a multi-
principal game in a labor market where two rms compete to attract workers who are characterized by
two di¤erent dimensions of private information.
The problem of the design of optimal incentive schemes for intrinsically motivated workers has been
tackled by Murdock (2002), Besley and Gathak (2005), Francois (2000 and 2003), Prendergast (2007) and
Ghatak and Mueller (2011), whose attention has primarily been devoted to moral hazard and free-riding,
while we consider the screening problem. Heyes (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) are the rst papers
that address the issue of the selection of workers who are heterogeneous with respect to their motivation.
Previous results from theoretical literature admitting for workersprivate information are ambiguous
on whether mission-oriented rms or sectors are able to hire workers with lower or higher productivity. In
particular, Handy and Katz (1998) nd that lower wages attract managers that are more committed to
the cause of the non-prot rm, but this comes at the cost of selecting less able managers.12 Delfgaauw
and Dur (2008) study the problem of workers self-selection into public vs private sectors when the
governmental agency designs screening contracts. Their screening mechanism is simplied because the
public agency is constrained to hire at most two types of agents. They nd that the public agency
optimally hires the more dedicated and the laziest workers in the economy, but they are able to compare
neither the workersability nor the wages across sectors.
The most closely related paper to ours is Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) that is framed in a full informa-
tion setup. They show that the return to managerial ability is lower in the public than in the private
sector. Hence, a public-private earnings di¤erential exists, which is caused partly by a compensating wage
di¤erential (motivated workers evaluate more being employed in the public sector) and partly by selection
arising endogenously (on average more productive workers enter the private sector where remuneration
is higher). Our model extends the setup in Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) in two ways: rst, bidimensional
asymmetric information is considered rather than full information about the workerscharacteristics and,
second, rms interact strategically. Our model too accounts for the result of negative selection of work-
ersability for the non-prot organization, coupled with the existence of a wage penalty for non-prot
workers. On top of that, we also document either ability-neutrality or even positive selection of ability
for the non-prot rm; the latter allows non-prot employees to enjoy a wage premium.
More recently, DeVaro et al. (2015) consider a non-prot rm, that is bound to o¤er at wages,
12A limit of the analysis is that an exogenously given ranking is imposed for the levels of e¤ort and for the reservation
wages of di¤erent types of managers.
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competing with perfectly competitive for-prot rivals in hiring workers. They show that workers hired
by the non-prot rm have su¢ ciently high intrinsic motivation and that a wage di¤erential favoring
for-prot workers emerges when for-prot rms are more e¤ective in training workers.13 The matching
of workers to rms is also analyzed by Kosfeld and von Siemens (2009, 2011) that model a competitive
labor market with team production and adverse selection, where selsh and conditionally cooperative
workers coexist. They show that workers separate in equilibrium, thereby leading to the emergence of
heterogeneous corporate cultures, like for-prot and non-prot. In addition, Auriol and Brilon (2014)
consider two types of intrinsically motivated workers, good and bad workers, and show that non-prot
organizations have to resort to higher monitoring to deter entry of bad workers, while for-prots increase
both monitoring and bonus payments for pro-social behavior to contrast bad workers. Finally, Bénabou
and Tirole (2016) study rms competing to attract workers who are heterogeneous with respect to their
productivity and their work ethics. In a framework with multitasking and moral hazard, they show
how competition for the most productive workers interacts with the incentive structure inside rms to
undermine work ethics. This paper di¤ers signicantly from ours because it assumes an a¢ ne (rather
than a non-linear) compensation scheme and it considers screening with respect to one dimension at a
time (either productivity or work ethics).
From a technical point of view, our paper draws both from the literature on multidimensional screening
and from the literature on multi-principals. Models where both problems are simultaneously considered
are very few.
Screening when agents have several unobservable characteristics has been analyzed by some important
papers that deal with continuous distributions of types: Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Choné (1998) and
Basov (2005). They all show that it is almost impossible to extend to the multidimensional environment
the qualitative results and the regularity conditions of the unidimensional case. Barigozzi and Burani
(2016a) use a discrete two-by-two setup to study the bidimensional screening problem of a mission-
oriented monopsonist willing to hire workers of unknown ability and motivation, when motivation is
output-dependent.
The multi-principal literature with asymmetric information was initiated by the seminal contribu-
tions of Martimort (1992) and Stole (1992). Within this literature, the paper that is most closely related
to ours is Rochet and Stole (2002) which extends the analysis carried out in Stole (1995) and studies
duopolists competing in nonlinear prices in the presence of both vertical and horizontal preference uncer-
tainty. Consumers are heterogeneous and privately informed about their preference for quality and about
their outside opportunity cost. Contracts consist of quality-price pairs that only depend on consumers
(unidimensional) preference for quality. The outside opportunity cost, a¤ects the consumersdecision
13The paper also tests the theoretical results with data on California establishments showing that for-prots rms o¤er
higher wages and higher incentive pay with respect to non-prots.
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about which rm to buy from.14 We depart from Rochet and Stole (2002) because they only consider
symmetric rms and nd that incentive compatibility constraints are never binding for any rm, so that
e¢ cient quality allocation with cost-plus-fee pricing emerge as the equilibrium outcome.15 Barigozzi and
Burani (2016b) extends the framework of Barigozzi and Burani (2016a) to allow for competition between
a non-prot and a for-prot hospital. There are two main di¤erences between Barigozzi and Burani
(2016b) and the present paper: rst, the former considers a two-by-two setup in which workersmotiva-
tion can only take two possible values, then, most importantly, it considers output-oriented motivation,
whereby optimal contracts depend on both workersability and motivation, not just on ability as in the
present context.
Another closely related model is Biglaiser and Mezzetti (2000), which studies an incentive auction in
which multiple principals bid for the exclusive services of an agent, who has private information about
ability. It is shown that only downward incentive constraints, if any, might be binding and that the
presence of multiple principals reduces the distortions in the agents e¤ort level. As opposed to Biglaiser
and Mezzetti (2000), we show that the upward incentive constraint might also be binding and this leads
to an upward distortion in the optimal allocation for high-ability workers.
2 The model
We consider a multi-principal setting with bidimensional asymmetric information. Two principals (rms)
compete to hire agents (workers). Each agent (she) can work exclusively for one principal. Principals
and agents are risk neutral.
Firms
Firms di¤er in the mission they pursue. One rm is prot-oriented while the other rm is a non-prot
institution. E¤ort supplied by the agent is the only input the two rms need in order to produce output.
We call x the observable and measurable e¤ort (task) level that the agent is asked to provide.16 Both
rmsproduction functions display constant returns to e¤ort so that the amount of output produced is
qi (x) = cix
for each rm i = F;N , with F and N referring to the for-prot and to the non-prot rm, respectively.
14A similar setup is analyzed in Lehmann et al. (2014) that considers optimal nonlinear income taxes levied by two
competing governments on individuals who are privately informed about their earnings capabilities (i.e. their skills) and
their migration costs.
15Precisely the same result can be found in Armstrong and Vickers (2001) that model rms as supplying utility directly
to consumers.
16 In particular, x can be interpreted as a job-specic requirement like the amount of hours of labor or the amount of
services the agent is asked to provide.
8
The marginal product of labor ci is rm-specic, and we allow for the for-prot to be more e¢ cient than
the non-prot rm or vice-versa (see the concluding section for a discussion on empirical evidence).
Prot margins (per-worker, conditional on the worker being hired) are given by
i (x) = piiqi (x)  wi (x) = piicix  wi (x) ; (1)
where wi (x) is the total wage or salary paid by rm i to the worker exerting e¤ort x and where the price
of output pi is assumed to be exogenous. Again, we do not impose any exogenous ranking of output
prices for the two rms, so that pF R pN (see below).
Importantly, parameter i captures the di¤erence in revenue appropriation between the two rms.17
We assume that F = 1 whereas 0 < N < 1, implying that the non-distribution constraint which the
non-prot rm is committed to limits the entrepreneurs ability to appropriate the rms revenues. As
we explain below, workersmotivational premium (which is enjoyed when they are hired by the non-
prot rm) is precisely generated by the non-prot commitment to this revenue constraint. For instance,
consider non-prot hospitals whose mission consists in providing care to both insured and uninsured
patients. Then, a non-prot hospital is rewarded only for the fraction N of insured patients that it treats
(compensated care), while its revenue is zero when treating uninsured patients (uncompensated/charity
care).18 Alternatively, our model could be rephrased in terms of a standard vs a mission-oriented rm,
where the latter sacrices some of its revenues or prots in the social interest: consider, for instance,
socially responsible organizations (see Bénabou and Tirole 2010 and Kitzmueller and Shimshack 2012),
or else ethical banks investing in social projects with low returns.
To economize on notation, let us set ki = piici, so that kN = kF describes a situation in which rms
are symmetric with respect to technology and prot margins, whereas ki > kj describes a situation in
which rm i has a competitive advantage with respect to rm j:
The case in which the for-prot has a competitive advantage over the non-prot rm (i.e. kF >
kN ) is perhaps the most likely to occur. It arises when the two rms di¤er uniquely in their revenue
appropriation, that implies N < F = 1, but are otherwise identical because they share the same
technology and face the same output prices. This occurs when hospitals are paid a xed tari¤ for every
patient admitted for treatment, as in Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) systems, like Medicare in the U.S.
or prospective payment systems in many European countries. It might also occur that the competitive
advantage of the for-prot organization is even stronger because marginal products of labor are such that
cN < cF ; as when the non-prot rm is committed to employ, as a fraction of its workforce, people with
disabilities or disadvantages and provide them with training and supportive services.
17A similar formulation of the objective function for non-prot rms was proposed in Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), following
the ideas expressed in Hansmann (1996). In Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), nonetheless, non-prot rms have prot -rather
than revenue- constrains.
18Think also about non-prot universities that provide total waivers of tuition fees to poor and promising students.
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But it might also be that the non-prot has a competitive advantage over the for-prot rm (i.e.
kN > kF ) because the former can command a higher output price than the latter, i.e. pN > pF :19 In
fact, some ethical consumers are willing to pay higher prices for goods and services produced by mission-
oriented or non-prot rms.20 Obviously, the technological or price advantage of the non-prot rm must
be su¢ ciently high as to fully o¤set the revenue constraint N < 1:
Workers
Consider a population of agents with unit mass, who di¤er in two characteristics, ability and intrinsic
motivation, that are independently distributed.
Ability takes two values, high and low. A worker characterized by high ability incurs in a low cost of
providing a given e¤ort level. Ability is denoted by  2 ; 	 where  >   1: A fraction  of employees
has high ability (i.e. a low cost of e¤ort) , the fraction 1   is instead characterized by low ability (i.e.
a high cost of e¤ort) : We will denote by  the di¤erence in ability, whereby  =    :
Intrinsic motivation is continuous and uniformly distributed in the interval

; 

; with  >   0:
For simplicity, we set  = 1 and  = 0; so that     = 1; i.e. the support of the distribution is the unit
interval. According to Heyes (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2010), we interpret intrinsic motivation
as a non-monetary benet that a worker enjoys when employed by a particular organization, which is
unrelated to output produced or e¤ort exerted. In our framework, the premium from intrinsic motivation
can only be enjoyed when workers are employed by the non-prot rm, because workers share its mission
and observe its commitment in terms of revenue constraint. For instance, health professionals derive, to a
certain extent, utility from exerting e¤ort at the non-prot hospital, because only then can they provide
treatment to poor and uninsured patients.
When a worker is not hired by any principal, we assume that her utility is zero. If a worker is hired
by one principal, her reservation utility or outside option is endogenous and it depends on the contract
o¤ered by the rival principal.
When a worker is hired by the for-prot principal, her utility is given by the salary gained less the
cost of e¤ort provision, which depends on the agents ability type . Thus,
uF = wF   1
2
x2F
In fact, motivated workers do not enjoy any benet from motivation when hired by the for-prot rm. As a
consequence, from the point of view of the for-prot rm, ability is the only relevant workerscharacteristic
19Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) show that the non-prot status serves as a commitment device to provide softer incentives,
which translates into an improvement of the quality of the product sold and into the consumershigher willingness to pay
for the non-prot goods.
20Caring consumers are ready to pay higher prices for commodities characterized by some public good attribute (Besley
and Ghatak 2007). Think also about parents willing to pay higher tuition fees for religious private schools or ethical investors
ready to accept lower interest rates when nancing social projects.
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because workers with the same ability are the same, irrespective of their level of motivation.21 Likewise,
when a worker is hired by the non-prot rm, her utility takes the form
uN = wN   1
2
x2N + ;
where only ability  is related to e¤ort exertion while motivation  is not action-oriented. Hence, the
premium for intrinsic motivation  does not directly a¤ect the non-prot rms output.
Observe that the marginal rate of substitution between e¤ort and wage is given by
MRSix;w =  
@ui=@xi
@ui=@wi
= xi;
for each rm i = F;N; which is always positive. Indeed, a worker of type  has preferences over e¤ort-
salary pairs which are independent of  (conditional on being hired by one rm). So all workers in-
di¤erence curves have positive slope in the (x;w) plane and the single-crossing property holds for both
rms.
Firmsstrategic interaction
Following Rochet and Stole (2002), we take the workersdecision to accept the job o¤ered by one rm
as given, and we suppose that rms o¤er incentive-compatible transfer schedules that are conditional on
the e¤ort target, i.e. we study non-linear wage schedules wi (xi) o¤ered by each rm i = F;N . Because
a worker of type  has preferences over e¤ort-salary pairs, which are independent of  (conditional on
being hired by one rm), then we can study the direct revelation mechanism such that each rm o¤ers
two incentive-compatible contracts, one for each ability type , consisting in an e¤ort target and a
wage rate, fxi () ; wi ()gi=F;N , and each agent selects the preferred pair. We can thus treat the rms
contract design problem as independent of the workerschoice about which rm to work for. The latter
is considered as an indirect mechanism, because no report on  is required. Given the contracts o¤ered
by the two rms, we nd the indirect utilities of a worker who truthfully reports her ability type  and
we use them to tackle the workers self-selection problem, which is determined by motivation . This is
why, in what follows, it will be more convenient to reason in terms of workersutility and to focus on
contracts of the form fxi () ; Ui ()gi=F;N .
Let Ui () denote the indirect utility or information rent of an agent of type  who is hired by rm i =
F;N , absent the benet accruing from intrinsic motivation. Then
Ui = max
xi
wi (xi)  1
2
x2i :
Denoting by xi () the solution to this program, one can write
Ui () = wi (xi ())  1
2
x2i () : (2)
21However, agents with the same ability and di¤erent motivation have di¤erent outside options.
11
Given Ui (), it is possible to determine the share of type  workers employed by each rm, i.e. the
probability that type  workers prefer to be hired by rm i rather than by the rival rm  i: Indeed, a
worker of type (; ) gets indirect utility UF () if she is hired by the for-prot rm, whereas if the same
worker is employed by the non-prot rm, her total indirect utility becomes
UN () = UN () + :
Denition 1 Indi¤ erent worker. Given ability ; the worker who is indi¤erent between working for
the non-prot or the for-prot rm is characterized by motivation
b () = UF ()  UN () : (3)
Thus, a type (; ) worker strictly prefers to work for the for-prot rm if her motivation falls short
of b (), i.e. if UN () +  < UF (); conversely, she strictly prefers to work for the non-prot rm if her
motivation exceeds b () and UN () +  > UF () : For further reference, note that b () represents the
labor donation, i.e. the amount of salary that workers are willing to give up in order to be hired by the
non-prot organization.
Given that  is uniformly distributed on the [0; 1] interval, the share of workers with ability  who
prefer being employed by the for-prot rm is given by
'F ()  Pr ( < b ()) = UF ()  UN () ; (4)
conversely, the share of agents preferring to be hired by the non-prot rm is
'N ()  Pr (  b ()) = 1  (UF ()  UN ()) : (5)
Obviously, in order for both rms to have a positive labor supply by type  workers, it must be that
0 < UF ()  UN () < 1() 'i () 2 (0; 1) for each i = F;N and each  2

; 
	
: (6)
This represents the most interesting situation to analyze because no rm is able to attract all the workers
of a given ability level. In what follows, we focus our attention precisely on the case in which condition
(6) is satised and each rm is able to attract both low- and high-ability workers. As we will show, this
requires that the two rms be su¢ ciently similar, or that their marginal revenues be close enough.
Finally, intrinsic motivation generates labor donations from the workers because the inequality UN () <
UF (), for every ; implies that for the same level of e¤ort non-prot workers accept a lower wage. Thus,
labor donations represent a benet for the non-prot rm, despite the fact that they come with a cost,
given the non-prot revenue constraints.
Before being able to set up the rmsmaximization problem, let us go back to (2) and solve for the
wage rate as
wi () = Ui () +
1
2
x2i () : (7)
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One can use expression (7) to eliminate the wage rate from the rms prots (1). Then, prot margins
relative to each type  worker can be written as
i () = Si ()  Ui () = kixi ()  1
2
x2i ()  Ui () (8)
where
Si ()  kixi ()  1
2
x2i () (9)
is the total surplus realized by a worker of type  providing e¤ort xi () for rm i (again, absent the
benet accruing from intrinsic motivation, when i = N). Indeed, Si () = i () + Ui () :
The program of each rm i = F;N is
maxxi();Ui() E (i) =


 
kixi ()  12x2i ()  Ui ()

'i () +
(1  )  kixi    12x2i    Ui  'i   (Pi)
Notice that motivation  does not appear in the program, because it is replaced by the fraction 'i () of
type  workers being hired by rm i = F;N , which in turn depends on the di¤erence between indirect
utilities UF ()  UN () (see equations 4 and 5). Moreover, in rm is program, the (reservation) utility
o¤ered by the other rm U i () is treated as given but it is endogenous (and dependent on ability
only). Thus, rms compete against each other in the utility space: an increase in the utility o¤ered to
a given type of worker reduces the rms payo¤ when hiring this worker but increases the probability of
hiring her.22 Finally, because ability is not observable by the principals, one has to add to each rms
maximization problem the workers incentive compatibility constraints. Provided that both rms are
able to hire workers with both ability levels, there are two incentive compatibility constraints for each
rm: the downward incentive constraint (henceforth DIC) meaning that high-ability types should not
be attracted by the contract o¤ered to low-ability types and the upward incentive constraint (henceforth
UIC) meaning that low-ability types are not willing to mimic high-ability workers. For each rm i = F;N
such constraints are given by
wi (xi ())  1
2
x2i ()  wi
 
xi
 

  1
2
x2i
 


and
wi
 
xi
 

  1
2
x2i
 

  wi (xi ())  1
2
x2i () ;
respectively. Again, observe that these constraints do not depend on  because motivation enters both
sides of each inequality and therefore it cancels out. One can use (7) in order to eliminate wages from
the above constraints and rewrite them as a function of e¤ort and utility, so that
Ui ()  Ui
 


+
1
2
 
   x2i   (DICi)
22Notice that the workersparticipation constraint does not appear in the rms program because we study direct mech-
anisms conditional on the agentschoice to work for each rm.
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and
Ui
 

  Ui ()  1
2
 
   x2i () : (UICi)
In the case of a monopsonistic rm willing to hire workers of unknown ability and with type-independent
outside options (the single-principal problem), the relevant constraint is DIC, showing that high-ability
workers receive an information rent for being able to mimic low-ability applicants. Given that we are
now analyzing a setting with competing principals and type-dependent, endogenous outside options, the
UIC constraint can also be relevant. As a consequence, low-ability workers too can receive information
rents. Finally, putting DICi and UICi together yields
1
2
 
   x2i    Ui ()  Ui    12     x2i ()
which makes it clear that incentive compatible contracts must satisfy: (i) the monotonicity or imple-
mentability condition
xi ()  xi
 


; (10)
requiring that high-ability workers exert more e¤ort than low-ability types at each rm i = F;N ; and
(ii) condition Ui ()   Ui
 

  0; requiring that the information rent of high-ability workers be higher
than that of low-ability types, for each employer i = F;N .
To sum up, each rm i = F;N maximizes its expected prots with respect to the e¤ort level xi ()
and the indirect utility Ui () set for each type  worker, taking as given the indirect utility U i that
the rival rm leaves to the workers, subject to the two incentive compatibility constraints DIC and UIC
illustrated above. Once the workers e¤ort levels and utilities are obtained, the related wages wi are
derived using equation (7).
Workersself-selection
Given the indirect utilities Ui () set by rms, prospective employees decide which rm to work for
according to their level of motivation. This characterizes the workersself-selection, which is relevant not
only under asymmetric information about ability ; but also when the skills of potential applicants are
perfectly observable. Three di¤erent sorting patterns of workers to rms are possible.
Denition 2 Workers self-selection. The sorting of workers between the for-prot and the non-
prot rm is such that:
(i) there is ability neutrality when
b () = b  () UF ()  UN () = UF    UN   ; (11)
(ii) there is a negative selection of ability into the non-prot rm when
b () > b  () UF ()  UN () > UF    UN   ; (12)
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(iii) there is a positive selection of ability into the non-prot rm when
b () < b  () UF ()  UN () < UF    UN   : (13)
Ability neutrality captures the situation in which 'i (), i.e. the fraction of workers who self-select
into rm i = F;N , is constant and does not depend on workersability.23 Negative (respectively, positive)
selection into the non-prot rm, instead, means that the fraction of workers attracted by rm N is bigger
(resp. smaller) the lower workersability, whereas the fraction of workers attracted by rm F is bigger
(resp. smaller) the higher workersability.24
Finally, the timing of the game is as follows. The two rms simultaneously design a menu of contracts
of the form fx ()i ; U ()igi=F;N . Workers observe the corresponding non-linear transfer schedule wi (xi)
for i = F;N , select the preferred one and thus choose which rm to work for. Then workers exert their
e¤ort level, output is produced, and the contracted wages are paid.
An equilibrium is such that each rm chooses a menu of contracts that maximizes its expected prot,
given the contracts o¤ered by the rival principal and given the equilibrium choice of workers. Workers
choose the contracts that maximize their utility.
3 The benchmark contracts: full information about ability
Let us rst consider the benchmark case in which workersability is fully observable, while motivation is
the workersprivate information. For each type  2 ; 	 ; rm i = F;N solves
max
xi();Ui()

kixi ()  1
2
x2i ()  Ui ()

'i () (PBi)
taking U i () ; which enters the expression for 'i (), as given. The rst-order condition with respect to
e¤ort level xi () yields
xBi () =
ki

= xFBi () , (14)
where i = F;N and where the superindeces B and FB stand for benchmark and rst-best, respectively.
In addition, using (14), the rst-order conditions with respect to utilities Ui () ; which are not symmetric
given how function 'i () is dened, solve for
UF () =
1
2

k2F
2
+ UN ()

and UN () =
1
2

k2N
2
  (1  UF ())

: (15)
23When intrinsic motivation is e¤ort-related, both Delfgaauw and Dur (2010, Section 5), under perfect information, and
Barigozzi and Burani (2016b), under bidimensional asymmetric information, show that, in equilibrium, sorting is ability
neutral.
24Delfgaauw and Dur (2010, Section 4) analyze this case when motivation is not e¤ort-related (as in our setting) and
rms fully observe workerscharacteristics.
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These are the reaction functions of the two rms, which characterize the optimal utility left by rm
i = F;N to an agent of type  given the utility U i () that this agent receives from the competing rm
 i. Reaction functions have positive slopes so that utilities can be interpreted as strategic complements
in this game. In a Nash equilibrium, the levels of utility given by both principals to type  solve (15)
simultaneously so that
UBN () =
1
3

k2N
 +
k2F
2   2

and UBF () =
1
3

k2F
 +
k2N
2   1

: (16)
Furthermore, we can use expression (3) to obtain the equilibrium value for the marginal worker of type
, who is indi¤erent between rms, that is
bB () = UBF ()  UBN () = 13

1 +
k2F   k2N
2

;
so that the fraction of type  workers who are hired by rm F is precisely 'BF () = bB () whereas the
fraction of type  workers that are hired by rm N is 'BN () = 2=3 
 
k2F   k2N

=6: Using (7) one can
compute the equilibrium salaries which are such that
wBN () =
1
3

5k2N+k
2
F
2   2

and wBF () =
1
3

k2N+5k
2
F
2   1

: (17)
The Proposition that follows summarizes the results obtained so far.
Proposition 1 Benchmark contracts. When ability is observable (and motivation is the workers
private information), the benchmark contracts are a Nash equilibrium of the game in which the non-prot
and for-prot rms compete in utility space. The benchmark contracts are such that each rm i = N;F
chooses the e¢ cient allocation xBi () = x
FB
i () and leaves to workers utilities given by (16).
Notice that, at equilibrium, motivated workers employed by the non-prot organization, not only
enjoy utility UBN () but also their motivational premium, so that their total indirect utility becomes
UN () = UBN () + :25
At equilibrium, how do workers characterized by di¤erent levels of ability sort between the two rms?
It depends on the di¤erence between the rmsmarginal revenues, i.e. kF and kN .
(i) Let us rst consider the case in which both rms have the same marginal revenues so that kF = kN =
k: Then
UBN () =
(3k2 4)
6 and U
B
F () =
(3k2 2)
6
with UBF () > U
B
N () : Moreover,
bB () = UBF ()  UBN () = 13 ;
25Also observe that, at the equilibrium under full information with respect to both ability and motivation, workers
employed by the non-prot rm receive a total indirect utility equal to UBN () because the rm is able to appropriate their
motivational premium by paying out only wBN ()  :
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whereby the indi¤erent worker has motivation  = 13 independently of her ability. All workers with
motivation higher than 13 prefer to work for the non-prot while all workers with motivation lower
than 13 prefer to apply at the for-prot rm. The premium  earned by motivated workers ensures
the non-prot rm a labor supply that is twice the one of the for-prot rm.26
(ii) Consider now the case in which kF > kN so that the for-prot rm has a competitive advantage with
respect to the non-prot rm. The indi¤erent worker with high ability has higher motivation than
the low ability one, i.e. bB () > bB  . This means that b () is decreasing in ; so that the share
of low-ability workers hired by the non-prot rm is larger than the share of high-ability workers.
Then, a negative selection of ability into the non-prot rm realizes. 27
(iii) To conclude, consider the case in which the non-prot rm has a competitive advantage, despite its
revenue constraints, kF < kN . Now bB () < bB   holds, meaning that b () is increasing in ,
and we observe a positive selection of ability into the non-prot rm.28
The Proposition below focuses on the consequences that the di¤erence in revenues between rms has
on workersself-selection.
Proposition 2 Workerssorting patterns at the benchmark contracts. When ability is observ-
able (and motivation is the workersprivate information), benchmark contracts are such that the sorting
of workers between rms only depends on the di¤erence in rms marginal revenues, i.e. on which rm
has a competitive advantage over the other: (i) if kF = kN there is ability-neutrality and bB () = bB   ;
(ii) if kF > kN there is a negative selection of ability into rm N and bB () > bB   holds; and (iii) if
kF < kN there is a positive selection of ability into rm N and bB () < bB   holds.
26Using condition (6) one can check that all workerstypes supply a positive amount of labour to both rms if and only
if marginal revenues are su¢ ciently high that UBN (2) > 0; or else if and only if k >
q
42
3
:
27Again, from condition (6), an interior solution exists if a positive mass of each type of workers is applying to each rm,
that is if 'F (1) = bB (1) < 1; i.e. if k2F   k2N < 41; or else if the di¤erence in rmsrevenues is not too high. When
the previous condition is not satised, then the non-prot rm only hires low-ability workers, given that all high-ability
applicants self-select into the for-prot rm.
28The non-prot rm always hires a positive mass of both high- and low-ability workers, whereas it might be the case
that the for-prot rm only hires low-ability workers. A positive mass of low-ability workers for the for-prot rm, now
requires that k2N   k2F < 21: again, the di¤erence in revenues must not be too high.
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Figure 1(a). Ability-neutrality: kF = kN
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Figure 1(b). Adverse selection of ability into the non-prot rm: kF > kN
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Figure 1(c). Propitious selection of ability into the non-prot rm: kN > kF
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Before moving to the case in which ability is private information, we would like to emphasize the
following. Independently of the sign of the di¤erence in marginal revenues between rms, an interior
solution exists, meaning that both rms are able to hire workers of each skill level, provided that the
di¤erence in revenues be su¢ ciently small. Otherwise, the advantaged rm is able to hire all workers of
a given skill level. In any case, full market segmentation according to skills never occurs, i.e. it is never
the case that all workers of a given skill level prefer to work for one rm, whereas all workers with the
other skill level prefer to be hired by the rival rm.
4 Screening for ability and incentive contracts
Let us now solve the complete problem in which neither ability nor motivation are observable. This
requires taking into account DIC and UIC constraints. Let us rst state some preliminary results. The
rst set of results provides the conditions under which the benchmark contracts analysed in Section 3
represent full-edged optimal contracts under asymmetric information about both workersability and
motivation. When those conditions are not fullled, we then provide further results that help reduce the
set of relevant incentive constraints to be considered for each rm.
Following the arguments developed by Biglaiser and Mezzetti (2000), we rst provide a su¢ cient
condition under which the benchmark contracts are incentive compatible for both rms. Then benchmark
contracts are the solution to the rmsproblems also under asymmetric information about workersability.
Under this condition, for each rm i = F;N , if agents of each type  2 ; 	 exert the rst-best e¤ort
level xFBi () and are compensated according to w
B
i () specied by (17), then low-ability workers do
not want to mimic high-ability agents and strictly prefers the contract
 
xFBi
 


; wBi
 


to the contract 
xFBi () ; w
B
i ()

: But the reverse is also true: high-ability workers do not want to mimic low-ability
agents. Hence, both incentive constraints are slack for both rms at the benchmark contracts and each
rms problem can be treated as two independent problems, one for each ability level, since the presence
of types  does not inuence the optimal contract that rm i o¤ers to types  and vice-versa.
Lemma 1 At the benchmark contracts, all incentive constraints are slack for both the for-prot and the
non-prot rm if
(kF + kN ) jkF   kN j
3min fk2F ; k2Ng
<
   

(18)
holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The Proposition that follows is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1.
Proposition 3 Incentive compatible benchmark contracts. Suppose that neither ability nor moti-
vation is observable. When condition (18) is satised, then optimal incentive contracts coincide with the
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benchmark contracts: for all  2 ; 	 ; both rms i = F;N ask workers to exert rst-best e¤ort levels
xi () = x
B
i () = x
FB
i () and provide compensation schemes w

i () = w
B
i ().
Lemma 1 provides the condition under which competition between two non-identical rms leads to an
e¢ cient allocation.29 Notice that this e¢ ciency result is more likely to be attained when the di¤erence
in rmstypes, namely the di¤erence in rmsmarginal revenues jkF   kN j ; is su¢ ciently low relative to
the di¤erence in workerstypes, i.e. the di¤erence in the costs of e¤ort provision    : When this is not
the case, i.e. when condition (18) is not satised, it means that the benchmark contracts of at least one
rm (the disadvantaged one) are no longer incentive compatible. Then, the following might happen.
Lemma 2 (i) If condition (18) fails to hold but condition
(kF + kN ) jkF   kN j
min fk2F ; k2Ng+ 2max fk2F ; k2Ng
<
   

 (kF + kN ) jkF   kN j
3min fk2F ; k2Ng
(19)
is satised, then the benchmark contracts o¤ered by the rm with the competitive advantage are still in-
centive compatible, whereas UIC might fail to be satised by the benchmark contracts of the disadvantaged
rm. (ii) If condition (19) fails to hold but condition
   

 (kF + kN ) jkF   kN j
min fk2F ; k2Ng+ 2max fk2F ; k2Ng
(20)
is satised, then neither rms benchmark contracts are incentive compatible and UIC might fail to be
satised by the benchmark contracts of the disadvantaged rm and DIC might fail to be satised by the
benchmark contracts of the advantaged rm.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In words, Lemma 2 states that, when the su¢ cient condition (18) is not met, UIC is binding rst for
the disadvantaged rm and then DIC is binding for the advantaged rm.
Figure 2 represents the relevant thresholds appearing in Lemmata 1 and 2, specifying which rm has
a competitive advantage relative to the rival.
29Notice that in Rochet and Stole (2002), due to the symmetry between rms, no incentive constraint can ever be binding.
Therefore in Rochet and Stole (2002) and in and Armstrong and Vickers (2001) as well, optimal contracts always consist
in e¢ cient allocations and cost-plus-xed-fee pricing.
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Figure 2. Incentive compatible benchmark contracts
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Finally, provided that the benchmark contracts no longer represent the optimal incentive contracts,
Lemma 3 species which are the incentive compatibility constraints that each rm can neglect, according
to the sorting pattern of workers into rms.30
Lemma 3 (i) When there is ability-neutrality and b () = b   holds, then neither DIC nor UIC can
be binding for either rm. (ii) When there is a negative selection of ability into rm N and b () > b  
holds, then neither UICF nor DICN can be binding. (iii) When there is a positive selection of ability
into rm N and b () < b   holds, then neither DICF nor UICN can be binding.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The cases (ii) and (iii) presented in Lemma 3 are outlined in more detail in the subsections that
follow.
Before beginning the analysis, let us introduce a restriction on skill levels which is needed in order
to ensure that rms make nonnegative prot margins on all ability types (see Appendix A.4 for more
details).
30These results stand in contrast with Biglaiser and Mezzetti (2000), where it is hown that UIC can never be binding.
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Assumption 1 The di¤erence in ability is su¢ ciently low so that 2 >  >   1 holds.
Thus, provided that Assumption 1 holds, each rm is able to hire a positive mass of workers of each
ability-type (and this allows us to focus on the intensive rather than the extensive margin).
4.1 Negative selection of ability into the non-prot rm
4.1.1 UIC binds for the non-prot rm
Take the case in which kN < kF and condition (18) fails to hold but condition (19) is satised. This is the
case in which UICN might bind while all incentives constraints are slack for rm F: Now, the program
for rm F is the unconstrained (PF ) whereas the problem for rm N is (PN) subject to UICN binding
that is
UN
 


= UN ()  1
2
 
   x2N () :
We refer the reader to Appendix A.3 for a detailed analysis of this case.
The proposition that follows provides the most important qualitative results, focusing on allocative
distortions and on informational rents (i.e. on how utilities left to the di¤erent types of workers change
with respect to the benchmark contracts). The information about optimal wages is provided later on, in
Section 5.
Proposition 4 Optimal incentive contracts when UICN binds. When kN < kF and condition
(18) is not satised whereas condition (19) holds, optimal contracts are such that: (i) the for-prot rm
sets e¤ort levels at the rst-best, i.e. xF () = x
FB
F () for each  2

; 
	
; and the non-prot rm
sets an e¢ cient allocation for low-ability workers, i.e. xN
 


= xFBN
 


; whereas it distorts high-ability
workers e¤ort upwards, i.e. xN () > x
FB
N () ; with x

N () < x

F () for each  2

; 
	
; and (ii) the
utilities of high-ability workers are lower whereas the utilities of low-ability workers are higher than at the
benchmark, i.e. Ui () < U
B
i () while U

i
 


> UBi
 


for each i = F;N:
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
With respect to the benchmark contracts, what changes is that the di¤erence in ability between
types decreases. This facilitates mimicking between agents with di¤erent ability levels. In particular,
the contract o¤ered by rm N to high-ability workers, i.e. types , becomes attractive for low-ability
applicant, i.e. types :31 Thus, rm N is forced to distort e¤ort of high-ability types  upwards in order
31 In order to give some more intuition, consider the following: rm F has a competitive advantage over rm N , therefore
the former is able to leave to its applicants a high utility, namely a high outside option. Because the di¤erence in ability
levels is su¢ ciently high in this case, it means that the outside option left by rm F to high-ability workers is not only high
in absolute terms, but also relative to the outside option left by the same rm F to low-ability types. Then , rm N has to
meet these high o¤ers of the competitor, and it is bound to leave to high-ability workers a high utility. This is why micking
from low-ability types becomes attractive.
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to make mimicking less attractive and, at the same time, to give information rents to low-ability types
 whose utility increases, whereby UN
 


> UBN
 


(see inequality 41 in Appendix A.3). Since utilities
are strategic complements, an increase in UN
 


also leads to an increase in UF
 


; although the rate of
change of UF
 


is half the rate of change of UN
 


: Then the probability of type  workers self-selecting
into rm N increases as well with respect to the benchmark contract and the e¤ect of negative selection
of ability is reinforced. In fact, the di¤erence UF
 

 UN   shrinks with respect to the benchmark andb   < bB   :
Moreover, the rst-order conditions also imply that UN () < U
B
N (). Again, the strategic comple-
mentarity in utilities leads to conclude that also UF () decreases with respect to the benchmark case,
but less than UN () : Therefore the di¤erence UF ()   UN () increases with respect to the benchmark
and we have b () > bB () :
4.1.2 UIC binds for the non-prot rm and DIC binds for the for-prot rm
Consider the case in which kF > kN and both conditions (18) and (19) fail to hold so that neither rm
can treat its contract o¤ered to low-ability agents as independent of the contract o¤ered to high-ability
agents and vice-versa. In particular, UIC binds for rm N while DIC binds for rm F . Now, the
program of rm N is (PN) subject to UICN binding
UN
 


= UN ()  1
2
 
   x2N () ;
as in the preceding case, whereas the program of rm F is (PF ) subject to DICF binding
UF () = UF
 


+
1
2
 
   x2F   :
Again, the Proposition that follows highlights the most relevant qualitative features of this equilibrium.
We refer the reader to Appendix A.5 for the detailed analysis of the system of rst-order conditions that
characterize the solution in this case.
Proposition 5 Optimal incentive contracts when UICN and DICF bind. When kN < kF and
neither condition (18) nor (19) is satised while condition (20) holds, optimal contract are such that: (i)
the for-prot rm sets an e¢ cient allocation for high-ability workers, i.e. xF () = x
FB
F (), whereas it
distorts downward the e¤ort of low-ability workers, i.e. xF
 


< xFBF
 


; the non-prot rm sets an
e¢ cient allocation for low-ability workers, i.e. xN
 


= xFBN
 


, whereas it distorts upwards the e¤ort
of high-ability workers, i.e. xN () > x
FB
N (); therefore e¤ort levels are such that x

N
 


< xN () <
xF
 


< xF () ; (ii) utilities U

N
 


and UF () are higher whereas utilities U

N () and U

F () are lower
than at the benchmark contracts.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
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What is new to this case is that the contract o¤ered by rm F to low-ability workers becomes attractive
for high-ability potential applicants. Firm F prevents high-ability workers from mimicking low-ability
types by distorting the e¤ort level required from low-skilled workers downwards and increasing the rents
left to high-skilled applicants, so that UF () necessarily increases with respect to the benchmark contracts.
Moreover, since rst-order conditions require that the utilities that the same rm leaves to di¤erent types
of agents move in opposite directions (see Appendix A.5), an increase in UF () is accompanied by a
decrease in UF
 


: Analogously, the increase in UN
 


that rm N implements in order to discourage
low-skilled workers from mimicking high-skilled ones, goes hand in hand with a decrease in UN () : Thus,
the di¤erence with the previous case, in which only UICN is binding, stems from the fact that strategic
complementarity is no longer relevant and that the utilities that the two rms o¤er to the same type of
worker no longer vary in the same direction: now they move in opposite directions. This has clear-cut
implications for the di¤erence UF ()   UN () = b () : Indeed, b () > bB () and b   < bB  
both hold (as when only UICN is binding) because the changes in utilities with respect to the benchmark
reinforce each other. This implies that incentive contracts exacerbate the negative selection e¤ect into
the non-prot rm which can already be observed at the benchmark contracts.
In the next subsection, we consider the symmetric case of positive selection. The uninterested reader
might skip this part and move directly to Section 4.3.
4.2 Positive selection of ability into the non-prot rm
The analysis of these cases is symmetric to the one in subsection 4.1, therefore we refer the interested
reader to Appendices A.6 and A.7 and we only state here the main qualitative results.
4.2.1 UIC binds for the for-prot rm
Consider the case in which kF < kN and in which condition (18) fails to hold but condition (19) is
satised. Then UICF might bind while all incentives constraints are slack for rm N . In particular, the
program for rm N is the unconstrained (PN) whereas the problem for rm F is (PF ) subject to UICF
binding
UF
 


= UF ()  1
2
 
   x2F () :
The optimal contracts are characterized in the Proposition that follows.
Proposition 6 Optimal incentive contracts when UICF binds. When kN > kF and condition
(18) is not satised whereas condition (19) holds, optimal contracts are such that: (i) the non-prot rm
sets e¤ort levels at the rst-best, i.e. xN () = x
FB
N () for each  2

; 
	
; and the for-prot rm sets an
e¢ cient allocation for low-ability workers, i.e. xF
 


= xFBF
 


; whereas it distorts high-ability workers
e¤ort upwards, i.e. xF () > x
FB
F () ; with x

F () > x

N () for each  2

; 
	
; (ii) the utilities o¤ered
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to low-ability workers are higher whereas the utilities o¤ered to high-ability workers are lower than at the
benchmark, i.e. Ui
 


> UBi
 


while Ui () < U
B
i () for each i = F;N:
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
4.2.2 UIC binds for the for-prot rm and DIC binds for the non-prot rm
Finally, consider the case in which kN > kF and both conditions (18) and (19) fail to hold, so that
neither rm can treat its contract o¤ered to low-ability agents as independent of the contract o¤ered to
high-ability agents and vice-versa. Now, the program of rm F is (PF ) subject to UICF binding
UF
 


= UF ()  1
2
 
   x2F () ;
as in the preceding case, whereas the program of rm N is (PN) subject to DICN binding
UN () = UN
 


+
1
2
 
   x2N   :
Again, the Proposition that follows highlights the most relevant qualitative features of this equilibrium.
Proposition 7 Optimal incentive contracts when UICF and DICN bind. When kN > kF and
neither condition (18) nor condition (19) holds, optimal contracts are such that: (i) the non-prot rm
sets an e¢ cient allocation for high-ability workers, i.e. xN () = x
FB
N (), whereas it distorts downward
the e¤ort of low-ability workers, i.e. xN
 


< xFBN
 


; the for-prot rm sets an e¢ cient allocation for
low-ability workers, i.e. xF
 


= xFBF
 


, whereas it distorts upward the e¤ort of high-ability workers,
i.e. xF () > x
FB
F (); therefore e¤ort levels are such that x

F
 


< xF () < x

N
 


< xN () ; (ii)
utilities UF
 


and UN () are higher whereas utilities U

F () and U

N
 


are lower than at the benchmark
contracts.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Before moving to the next section and analyse optimal wages, let us consider the sorting pattern of
workers to rms.
4.3 Incentive contracts and workerssorting patterns
When the non-prot rm has a competitive disadvantage with respect to the for-prot rm , i.e. kN < kF ,
and incentive contracts are in place, there is negative selection of ability into the non-prot rm and we
nd that b () > bB () and b   < bB   : In other words, the negative selection e¤ect is exacerbated
with respect to the benchmark contracts. This implies that the labor supply from high-ability workers
faced by the non-prot rm (respectively the for-prot rm) decreases (resp. increases) relative to the
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benchmark, whereas the labor supply from low-ability workers faced by the non-prot rm (respectively
the for-prot rm) increases (resp. decreases) relative to the benchmark.
This stands in contrast to the case in which kN > kF holds and there is positive selection into the
non-prot rm. Then both b () < bB () and b   > bB   are true. This means that when the
non-prot rm has a competitive advantage over the for-prot rm and incentive contracts are needed,
then the positive selection e¤ect is reinforced with respect to the benchmark contracts. Then, the labor
supply from high-ability workers faced by the non-prot rm (respectively the for-prot rm) increases
(resp. decreases) relative to the benchmark, whereas the labor supply from low-ability workers faced by
the non-prot rm (respectively the for-prot rm) decreases (resp. increases) relative to the benchmark
contacts.
It is then possible to bunch both cases of negative and positive selection and derive a general statement
about how workersself-selection into the non-prot and the for-prot rm changes when the benchmark
contracts are no longer incentive compatible.
Proposition 8 Workers sorting patterns at the incentive contracts. When condition (18) is
not satised and incentive contracts are in place, the selection e¤ects of ability are more pronounced (i.e.
the function b () is steeper) than at the benchmark contracts.
The above Proposition suggests that each rm designs its incentive contracts in such a way as to make
the sorting pattern of workers even more favorable to itself. Indeed, when UIC is binding for one rm,
its prot margins are higher for low-ability than for high-ability workers.32 Therefore the disadvantaged
rm, whose UIC is binding, is better-o¤ the higher the fraction of low-ability workers that it is able
to hire and the lower the fraction of high-ability workers that it captures. The opposite happens when
DIC is binding for the rm with a competitive advantage: its prot margins are higher for high-ability
than for low-ability workers, therefore this rm is better-o¤ if it succeeds in hiring an increasing fraction
of high-ability workers and a decreasing share of low-ability workers. Therefore, it becomes relatively
more convenient for the advantaged rm to attract high-ability workers and for the disadvantaged rm to
attract low-ability applicants. That is why the selection e¤ects of ability are exacerbated at the incentive
contracts.
Finally, Proposition 8 hints at the possibility that incentive contracts might have a sort of exclusionary
e¤ect. Indeed, starting from an interior solution at the benchmark contracts, one might observe that under
the incentive contracts the following happens: the supply of high-skilled labor might vanish either for
rm N under negative selection or for rm F under positive selection. In sum, incentive contracts might
drive the supply of high-skilled labor to zero for the disadvantaged rm.
32See the preliminary Result 1 contained in the proof of Lemma 3 in Appendix A.2.
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5 Wage di¤erentials
In this section, we analyze the wage di¤erential, i.e. sign (wF ()  wN ()) ; that characterizes the
contracts o¤ered in equilibrium by the two rms. In particular, we study whether a worker with given
ability  is paid more by the for-prot or by the non-prot rm. Interestingly, our results concern not only
the sign of the wage di¤erential but also its composition: we are able to disentangle the e¤ect of labor
donations to the non-prot rm stemming from workersmotivation from the e¤ect of the negative or
positive selection into the non-prot rm (which depends upon which rm holds a competitive advantage
relative to the other).
Fixing ; let us then consider when sign (wF ()  wN ()) > 0 holds, i.e. when a wage penalty
for non-prot workers is in place. Using expression (7) for the wage rate, the wage di¤erential can be
rewritten as
UF () +
1
2
x2F () 

UN () +
1
2
x2N ()

> 0;
or, rearranging, as
UF ()  UN ()| {z }
b()
labor donation (+)
+
1
2

 
x2F ()  x2N ()

| {z }
negative selection (+) / positive selection (-)
> 0; (21)
for each  2 ; 	 : Expression (21) above contains two terms. The rst one is the di¤erence between
worker s utility at the two rms, and is always positive because it corresponds to the level of motivation
of the indi¤erent worker, i.e. b (), which is strictly positive at an interior solutions, such that the
share of workers with ability  applying to any rm i = F;N is always positive. Thus, the rst term
represents the labor donation and corresponds to the amount of salary that su¢ ciently motivated workers
(that is workers with motivation   b ()) are willing to give up in order to be hired by the non-
prot rm. The second term is the di¤erence between the squared levels of e¤ort set by the two rms,
where xF () > xN () when the selection into the non-prot rm is negative (because kF > kN ) or
xF () < xN () when the selection into the non-prot rm is positive (because kN > kF ). Thus, the
second term in expression (21) reects the impact of the selection of workers into rms, which in turn
depends on which rm has a competitive advantage over the other.
Notice that the unique instance in which the wage di¤erential turns out to be negative, so that
wF () < wN () and non-prot employees experience a wage premium, is when not only is there positive
selection into the non-prot rm but also when the selection e¤ect is strong enough to o¤set the labor
donation e¤ect. This case requires that the competitive advantage of the non-prot rm be relevant
enough.
Wage di¤erentials not only arise at the optimal incentive contracts: they are already in place at the
benchmark contracts. So, in what follows, let us distinguish between the two cases.
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5.1 Benchmark contracts
Let us consider rst the benchmark contracts. In particular, suppose that motivation is the workers
private information and that either ability is observable or ability is not observable but the su¢ cient
condition (18) is satised.
Proposition 9 Wage di¤ erentials at the benchmark contracts. At the benchmark contracts, a
wage penalty for non-prot employees is in place, i.e. wBF () > w
B
N () holds for all  2

; 
	
; unless
there is positive selection of ability into rm N and the competitive advantage of rm N is su¢ ciently
high that k2N   k2F  2 :
More specically, consider the expressions for wages given by equation (17). Suppose rst that no rm
has a competitive advantage over the other so that kN = kF = k: Then, it is easy to see that wages o¤ered
by the two rms are always such that wBF () > w
B
N () for every : For each level of workersability,
a wage di¤erential favoring workers employed at the for-prot rm is in place. Indeed, the for-prot
rm asks its employees to provide the same rst-best e¤ort that is required by the non-prot rm, but
in exchange for a higher salary. Here the wage di¤erential is purely compensating because it originates
uniquely from labor donations.
When, instead, rm F holds a competitive advantage and kN < kF , the selection e¤ect is always
positive. A wage premium in favour of for-prot workers exists also in this case, but workers are now
asked to exert a higher e¤ort at the for-prot than at the non-prot rm.
Finally, when kN > kF and the selection e¤ect is negative, the wage di¤erential may have a di¤erent
sign according to the magnitude of the di¤erence in rms revenues. In particular, a wage premium
favoring for-prot workers still exists provided that k2N   k2F < 2 : Alternatively, if 2  k2N   k2F < 2 ;
then high-ability workers earn more when they are employed by the non-prot than by the for-prot rm,
whereas low-ability workers earn more when they are employed by the for-prot than by the non-prot
rm. This result is indeed peculiar given that the wage di¤erential changes its sign according to the
ability of the workers. Finally, if k2N   k2F  2 , then all workers get a wage premium when hired by the
non-prot rm. Thus, when the non-prot rm has a competitive advantage over the for-prot rival,
both wage premia and penalties can be observed. If the di¤erence in marginal revenues is not too high,
then non-prot workers exert more e¤ort but are paid less than for-prot employees, given their ability.
When instead the advantage of the non-prot rm is su¢ ciently important, then the non-prot workers
higher e¤ort is rewarded with a higher salary.
5.2 Incentive contracts
When neither ability nor motivation is observable and the su¢ cient condition (18) is not satised, then
at least one rm o¤ers a contract such that the e¤ort level set for one type  worker is distorted.
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Let us start with the case in which kF > kN ; and let us check how the rent-extraction, e¢ ciency
trade-o¤ faced by the two rms a¤ects the two terms of inequality (21).
When only UICN is binding, the non-prot rm is bound to pay an information rent to the mimickers,
i.e. to low-ability workers, so that UN
 


> UBN
 


. Moreover, rm N also distorts the e¤ort required
from the high-ability type  upwards to save in informations rents left to type , whereby xN () >
xFBN () : And since the utilities that a rm leaves to di¤erent types of agents move in opposite directions
with respect to the benchmark, it also holds that UN () < U
B
N ()(see Appendix A.3). Consider now
the for-prot rm. For every ; it still sets UF () according to its reaction function, nevertheless, being
utilities strategic complements, UF
 


increases as a consequence of the increase in UN
 


, and UF ()
decreases as a consequence of the decrease in UN () ; but these e¤ects are of second order. It then follows
that the wages of low-ability workers increase with respect to the benchmark, i.e. wi
 


> wBi
 


for
each i = F;N; whereas the wage o¤ered by rm F to high-ability workers decreases with respect to the
benchmark, i.e. wF () < w
B
F (), and the e¤ect on the wage o¤ered by rm N to high-ability workers
is ambiguous, i.e. wN () ? wBN (). Moreover, for low-ability workers, the labor donative e¤ect, i.e. the
rst term in equation (21), is lower with respect to the benchmark, so that b   < bB   ; and the
term related to the selection e¤ect does not change because there are no allocative distortions for types
: Therefore, low-ability workers still experience a non-prot wage penalty, which is nonetheless reduced
with respect to the benchmark. As for high-ability workers, they also experience a wage penalty, but it
is ambiguous whether it is lower at the incentive than at the benchmark contracts. This might well be
be the case given that wF () < w
B
F () :
Let us then move to consider the instance in which both UICN and DICF are binding. The main
di¤erence with respect to the preceding case is that now xF
 


is distorted downward. This reinforces
the e¤ect on the non-prot wage penalty for low-ability workers, because the selection e¤ect is positive
but smaller compared to the benchmark. So the wage penalty is reduced with respect to the benchmark
contracts for low-ability workers. As for high-ability workers it is ambiguous whether the wage penalty
is higher or lower with respect to the benchmark, but it seems more likely that it be higher, given that
wF () > w
B
F () while the e¤ect on wN () is uncertain.
Conclusions which are symmetric to the ones above can be drawn for the case of positive selection
and kN > kF :
The proposition that follows provides a synthesis of our results.
Proposition 10 Wage di¤ erentials at the incentive contracts. (a) If kF > kN ; a wage di¤erential
penalizing all non-prot workers exists and it is always lower than at the benchmark contracts for low-
ability workers. (b) If kN > kF ; both wage penalties and wage premia for non-prot workers might
be observed. For low-ability workers, if a non-prot wage premium is in place, it is lower than at the
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benchmark contracts whereas if a non-prot wage penalty is in place, it is higher than at the benchmark
contracts.
To sum up, we can conclude that, in general: (i) the revenue appropriation constraint of the non-prot
rm, i.e. N < 1; and (ii) labor donations from employees, captured by ^
 () ; push towards a wage
penalty for workers employed at the non-prot organization. Nonetheless, our model also predicts that
wage premia for non-prot employees are possible, but only when the non-prot organization benets
from a competitive advantage and this advantage is su¢ ciently high. In such a case, the non-prot rm
benets most from hiring high-ability workers and, despite labor donations received from all its employees,
it pays both high- and low-ability employees a compensation that is larger than the one o¤ered by the
for-prot rm.
Finally, the allocative distortions introduced by the incentive contracts are such that, for low-ability
workers, the di¤erence in e¤ort levels required by the two rms shrinks with respect to the benchmark.
Then the selection e¤ects (see the second term of equation 21) for low-productivity workers are reduced
and this is the reason why the wage di¤erential for low-ability workers is smaller than at the benchmark.
This is not necessarily true for high-ability employees, because the di¤erence in e¤ort levels required by
the two rms can either increase of decrease relative to the benchmark according to which rm holds the
competitive advantage.
6 Concluding remarks
How does asymmetric information in the labor market a¤ect the competition between for-prot and
non-prot organizations willing to attract the most talented and motivated workers? In our model
workers are willing to donate a part of their labor to the non-prot rm because the latter is committed
to a mission and sacrices some revenues in the social interest. While, at the equilibrium, workers
with high motivation are always hired by the non-prot rm, one of the two organizations, i.e. the
one which is characterized by a competitive advantage, succeeds in attracting the largest share of high
ability workers. This selection pattern is conrmed and exacerbated under asymmetric information when
screening contracts are analyzed. For example, in the likely case in which committing to the non-prot
status makes the non-prot rm the weaker competitor (kN < kF ), the latter is able to hire only a
lower share of talented workers and attracts instead a larger share of low-ability workers relative to the
benchmark.
As for wage di¤erentials, our model allows us to decompose the gap in the wages o¤ered by the
two rms in two terms: the rst term quanties labor donations and pushes towards a wage penalty for
employees at the non-prot rm. The second term describes instead the selection e¤ects: it can be positive
or negative according to the selection pattern of ability into the non-prot rm. Both terms are a¤ected
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by possible distortions due to asymmetric information. Our model is su¢ ciently rich to account for both
non-prot wage penalties and wage premia, being thus coherent with the mixed empirical evidence.
The models results crucially depend on the relative magnitude of the two rmsmarginal revenues
which are summarized by the parameters kN = pNNcN and kF = pF cF . Here we would like to
consider the variables dening the two parameters (ci and pi in particular) and provide some statistics
and real world examples. In particular, we argue that the case kN > kF is empirically relevant, either
because cN > cF or because pN > pF or the two together, despite the non-prot revenue appropriation
constraints.33
The parameter ci denotes the marginal product of labor and captures the productive e¢ ciency of
a rm. Whether for-prot or non-prot competitors are more e¢ cient is an empirical question and
the evidence on this matter is mixed. As an example of the variability of empirical results, we report
some evidence on productivity of for-prot and non-prot hospitals reviewed Barros and Siciliani (2012).
Evidence reported in Sherman et al. (1997) overall suggests that non-prot hospitals in the U.S. are
not very di¤erent in economic e¢ ciency from for-prot hospitals. In the same way, Farsi and Filippini
(2008) nd no signicant di¤erences by ownership in Swiss hospitals. In our model this is coherent with
the case in which cN = cF , namely the instance in which the two rms are endowed with the same
technology. More recently, Shen et al. (2007) nd that for-prot hospitals in the U.S. tend to be more
e¢ cient than non-prot ones. In our model, this corresponds to cN < cF . Finally, di¤erently from the
previously mentioned papers, Rosko (2001) analyzes a sample of 1,631 hospitals in the U.S. during the
period 1990-1996 and nds that non-prot hospitals are more productive. This may correspond to a case
where cN > cF .
As a second example about heterogeneity in rmsproductivity, we report some gures about for-
prot and non-prot colleges in the U.S. As the 2012 U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Labor, Education
and Pensions indicates, on average, for-prots spent $3,017 per student on instructional costs vs $15,321
at private non-prot colleges. Average tuition cost at for-prot colleges is $31,000 after grants vs $26,600
for non-prot colleges. Importantly, 28% of for-prot college students graduate with a four-year degree vs
65% at private, non-prot colleges. Finally, for-prot schools spent $8 per student on research vs $5,887
per student at private non-prots. Overall, the previous statistics motivate the title of the report For-
Prot Higher Education: The Failure to Safeguard the Federal Investment and Ensure Student Success
and suggest that, on average, U.S. for-prot colleges are not more e¢ cient than non-prot ones. Again,
this might correspond to a case where cN > cF :
Let us turn now to possible di¤erences in prices. We have already provided some examples in the
model set up. Here, we would like to emphasize that the case pN > pF has empirical relevance. Consider
33Recall that the inequality kN > kF implies positive selection of ability for the non-prot rm and it is also a necessary
condition for non-prot wage premia.
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consumption prices observed in markets where standard and mission-oriented/ethical rms coexist. Sur-
veys of ethical shopping show that many (ethical) consumers are willing to pay higher prices for goods
and service produced by do-gooders companies. Moreover, ethical consumers have a relatively high in-
come, education, and social status. But what about price di¤erences between standard companies and
mission-oriented rms for comparable products? A research conducted by the U.K. magazine Ethical
Consumer shows that ethical products have higher prices.34
As a last remark, with respect to the debate about the desirability of a wage cap for CEOs of non-
prot rms, our model shows that competition between for-prot and non-prot rms is benecial since
it allows to decrease allocative distortions in the screening contracts. Indeed, when the two rms are
su¢ ciently similar to each other, then equilibrium allocations are e¢ cient. A wage cap would obviously
interfere with such market forces and would impair e¢ ciency.
More generally, our model suggests that the revenue constraint characterizing non-prot rms should
be su¢ cient enough to generate labor donations from motivated workers but should go in the direction
of making the possible di¤erences in marginal revenues between for-prot and non-prot rms vanish.
This would allow competition to restore e¢ ciency.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemmata 1 and 2
Let us go back to the equilibrium utilities of the benchmark case in Section 3 and let us write them as
follows
UBi () = w
B
i () 
1
2

 
xBi ()
2
with  2 ; 	 and i = F;N: Furthermore, let us dene the function Bi  ;  as the di¤erence between
the utility that type  receives from rm i when revealing her true type and the utility that type  would
receive from the same rm i when claiming that her type is , if exerting the rst-best level of e¤ort
and receiving a compensation as in the benchmark contract. Thus, function Bi
 
; 

corresponds to the
downward incentive constraint DIC whereby type  is not attracted by the contract that rm i o¤ers to
type , conditional on rm i requiring all agents to exert rst-best e¤ort levels and giving compensation
schemes as in the benchmark contracts. When Bi
 
; 

> 0 it means that DICi is always slack at
the benchmark contract, or else that the benchmark contract is downward incentive compatible for rm
i = F;N . Then
Bi
 
; 

= wBi () 
1
2

 
xBi ()
2   wBi    12  xBi  2

:
Notice that, in the above expression, the consequence of type  mimicking type  is visible directly in
the cost of e¤ort. All other e¤ects are mediated by type  choosing e¤ort xBi
 


instead of e¤ort xBi () :
Likewise, one can obtain functions Bi
 
; 

for each rm i = F;N , reverting the roles of the ability
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types. When Bi
 
; 

> 0; UICi is always slack, again conditional on rm i requiring all agents to exert
rst-best e¤ort levels and giving compensation schemes as in the benchmark contracts. Let us rewrite
functions Bi extensively and rearrange terms. For rm N; one has
BN
 
; 

=
(2k2N 3k2N+k2F )( )
6
;
where BN
 
; 

> 0 holds for kF  kN , whereas, for kF < kN ; BN
 
; 

> 0 is satised if and only if
k2N   k2F
2k2N + k
2
F
<
   

: (22)
Moreover,
BN
 
; 

=
(3k2N 2k2N k2F )( )
6
where BN
 
; 

> 0 holds for kF  kN , whereas, for kF > kN ; BN
 
; 

> 0 is satised if and only if
k2F   k2N
3k2N
<
   

; (23)
which corresponds to condition (18) in the main text. Considering rm F , one has
BF
 
; 

=
(2k2F  3k2F +k2N)( )
6
;
with BF
 
; 

> 0 that holds when kF  kN , whereas, for kF > kN , BF
 
; 

> 0 is satised if and only
if
k2F   k2N
2k2F + k
2
N
<
   

: (24)
Finally,
BF
 
; 

=
(3k2F  k2N 2k2F )( )
6
;
where BF
 
; 

> 0 is always true when kF  kN ; whereas, for kF < kN ; BF
 
; 

> 0 is satised if and
only if
k2N   k2F
3k2F
<
   

; (25)
which, again, corresponds to condition (18) in the main text.
Summing up, suppose that kF = kN : Then all 
B
i are strictly positive and we can conclude that
the benchmark contracts are incentive compatible, so that they are the optimal contracts not only when
ability is observable, but also when ability is the agents private information. Alternatively, suppose
that kF > kN : Then 
B
N
 
; 

and BF
 
; 

are strictly positive meaning that the benchmark contracts
are always downward incentive compatible for rm N and upward incentive compatible for rm F ,
respectively. Moreover, BN
 
; 

> 0 holds when condition (23) is satised and BF
 
; 

> 0 holds when
condition (24) is satised, with
k2F   k2N
2k2F + k
2
N
<
k2F   k2N
3k2N
:
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Then, all Bi are strictly positive and both rmsbenchmark contracts are incentive compatible when
condition (23) holds, whereas only BF are strictly positive meaning that only rm Fs benchmark contracts
are incentive compatible when
k2F   k2N
2k2F + k
2
N
<
   

 k
2
F   k2N
3k2N
;
which corresponds to condition (19) in the main text. Finally, when
   

 k
2
F   k2N
2k2F + k
2
N
;
it means that neither rms benchmark contracts are incentive compatible. To conclude, suppose that
kF < kN : Then 
B
N
 
; 

and BF
 
; 

are strictly positive implying that the benchmark contracts
are always upward incentive compatible for rm N and downward incentive compatible for rm F ,
respectively. Moreover, BN
 
; 

> 0 holds when condition (22) is satised and BF
 
; 

> 0 holds when
condition (25) is satised, with
k2N   k2F
2k2N + k
2
F
<
k2N   k2F
3k2F
:
Then, all Bi are strictly positive and both rmsbenchmark contracts are incentive compatible when con-
dition (22) holds, whereas only BN are strictly positive meaning that only rm Ns benchmark contracts
are incentive compatible when
k2N   k2F
2k2N + k
2
F
<
   

 k
2
N   k2F
3k2F
;
which, again, corresponds to condition (19) in the main text. Finally, when
   

 k
2
N   k2F
2k2N + k
2
F
;
neither rms benchmark contracts are incentive compatible.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
In order to prove Lemma 3, let us rst consider a preliminary step. Let us express incentive constraints
in terms of prot margins on each ability type (see expression 8), whereby DICi becomes
i ()  i
 

  Si ()  Si    1
2
 
   x2i  
and UICi takes the form
Si ()  Si
 

  1
2
 
   x2i ()  i ()  i   :
Result 1 (i) If DICi is binding for rm i = F;N , then prot margins are strictly decreasing in  and
i () > i
 


: (ii) If UICi is binding for rm i = F;N , then prot margins are strictly increasing in 
and i
 


> i () : (iii) If neither DICi nor UICi is binding for either rm, then prot margins can be
either decreasing or increasing in :
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Proof. The proof of this result follows an argument similar to the one developed by Rochet and Stole
(2002). When DICi is binding for rm i = F;N , e¤ort levels are such that xi
 

  xFBi   and
xi () = x
FB
i () ; namely, the high-ability type gets the rst-best while the e¤ort of the low-ability type
is downward distorted. Moreover, when DICi is binding, one has
i ()  i
 


= Si ()  Si
 

  1
2
 
   x2i   :
The right-hand-side of the above equality is minimized when xi
 


is the highest possible, that is when
it equals the rst-best e¤ort level. Substituting for such e¤ort level yields
i ()  i
 


= Si ()  Si
 

  12     x2i   
k2i ( )
2
  12
 
    k2i

=
k2i ( )
2
2
> 0
:
Similarly, when UICi is binding for rm i = F;N , e¤ort levels are such that xi
 


= xFBi
 


and
xi ()  xFBi () ; namely, the low-ability type gets the rst-best while the e¤ort of the low-ability type
is distorted upwards. Moreover, when UICi is binding, one has
i ()  i
 


= Si ()  Si
 

  1
2
 
   x2i () :
The right-hand-side of the above equality is maximized when xi () is the lowest possible, that is when
it equals the rst-best e¤ort level. Substituting for such e¤ort level yields
i ()  i
 


= Si ()  Si
 

  12     x2i () 
k2i ( )
2
  12
 
    k2i =  k2i ( )22 < 0 :
When neither DICi nor UICi is binding, then each rm sets all e¤ort levels at the rst-best and prot
margins can be either positive or negative.
Let us then move to the actual proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that there is negative selection of ability
for rm N and thus that b () > b   holds, whereby
UF ()  UN () > UF
 

  UN  () 1   UF    UN   > 1  (UF ()  UN ()) :
Take the problem PN of the non-prot rm (see page 13) subject to DICN and UICN . Build the
Lagrangian associated with this problem, where DN and 
U
N are the multipliers associated with DICN
and UICN ; respectively
LN = 
 
kNxN ()  12x2N ()  UN ()

(1  (UF ()  UN ()))
+ (1  )  kNxN    UN    12x2N    1   UF    UN  
+DN
 
UN ()  UN
 

  12     x2N  + UN  UN    UN () + 12     x2N ()
: (26)
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The rst-order conditions relative to utilities are
@LN
@UN ()
=   (1  (UF ()  UN ()))
+
 
kNxN ()  12x2N ()  UN ()

+ DN   UN = 0
(N1)
@LN
@UN()
=   (1  )  1   UF    UN  
+(1  )  kNxN    12x2N    UN    DN + UN = 0 (N2)
Consider the following two cases.
(a) Suppose that UN > 0 while 
D
N = 0: Then DIC is slack while UIC is binding. Then equations
(N1) and (N2) become
@LN
@UN ()
=   (1  (UF ()  UN ()))
+
 
kNxN ()  12x2N ()  UN ()
  UN = 0 (N1a)
@LN
@UN()
=   (1  )  1   UF    UN  
+(1  )  kNxN    12x2N    UN  + UN = 0 : (N2a)
Solving both (N1a) and (N2a) for UN yields
N ()  kNxN ()  1
2
x2N ()  UN () > 1  (UF ()  UN ())
and
1   UF    UN   > kNxN    1
2
x2N
 

  UN    N  
Given that, by Result 1, prot margins are increasing in  when UIC is binding, one has that
1   UF    UN   > N   > N () > 1  (UF ()  UN ())
which requires negative selection of ability for rm N . In other words, our initial assumption about
negative selection is compatible with UIC binding for the N rm.
(b) Conversely, assume that UIC is slack while DIC is binding whereby UN = 0 while 
D
N > 0: Now,
rst-order conditions (N1) and (N2) specify as
@LN
@UN ()
=   (1  (UF ()  UN ()))
+
 
kNxN ()  12x2N ()  UN ()

+ DN = 0
(N1b)
@LN
@UN()
=   (1  )  1   UF    UN  
+(1  )  kNxN    12x2N    UN    DN = 0 : (N2b)
Solving both (N1b) and (N2b) for DN yields
1  (UF ()  UN ()) > kNxN ()  1
2
x2N ()  UN ()  N ()
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and
N
 

  kNxN    1
2
x2N
 

  UN   > 1   UF    UN   :
Prot margins are decreasing in  when DIC is binding and thus
1  (UF ()  UN ()) > N () > N
 


> 1   UF    UN  
contradicting the fact that theres negative selection of ability for rm N .
Considering now the problem PF of the for-prot rm yields the following result: the assumption of
negative selection of ability for rm N is compatible with DIC being binding and UIC being slack for
rm F (because prot margins are decreasing in  when DIC is binding); such assumption is instead
incompatible with DIC being slack and UIC being binding for rm F (because prot margins are
increasing in  when UIC is binding).
Finally, when one assumes either a positive selection of ability for rm N or ability-neutrality, the
argument follows the same lines and is thus left to the reader.
A.3 Negative selection: Optimal contracts when UIC binds for the non-prot
rm
Suppose that kF > kN . Consider rst the problem of rm F . It corresponds to (PF ) at page 2 under no
additional constraints, therefore rm F solves
maxxF ;UF E (F ) = 
 
kFxF ()  12x2F ()  UF ()

(UF ()  UN ())
+ (1  )  kFxF    UF    12x2F    UF    UN   :
The system of rst-order conditions to this problem is
@E(F )
@xF ()
=  (kF   xF ()) (UF ()  UN ()) = 0 ; (30)
@E(F )
@xF ()
= (1  )  kF   xF    UF    UN   = 0 ; (31)
@E(F )
@UF ()
=   (UF ()  UN ()) + 
 
kFxF ()  12x2F ()  UF ()

= 0 ; (32)
and nally
@E(F )
@UF ()
=   (1  )  UF    UN  + (1  )  kFxF    UF    12x2F   = 0 (33)
Conditions (30) and (31) yield rst-best e¤ort levels, whereby xF () =
kF
 = x
FB
F () for all  2

; 
	
:
Conditions (32) and (33) can be rewritten substituting for optimal e¤ort levels in order to obtain
UF () =
1
2

k2F
2 + UN ()

and UF
 


= 12

k2F
2
+ UN
 


: (34)
41
Consider now rm N and assume that UIC is binding while DIC is slack. Its program is (PN) and
the Lagrangian associated with it is
LN = E (N ) + UN

UN
 

  UN () + 1
2
 
   x2N ()
with UN > 0 being the Lagrange multiplier associated with UIC and E (N ) being the expected prots
of rm N (as in equation 26). The rst-order conditions with respect to e¤ort levels are
@LN
@xN ()
=  (kN   xN ()) (1  (UF ()  UN ())) + UN
 
   xN () = 0 (35)
and
@LN
@xN()
= (1  )  kN   xN    1   UF    UN   = 0 (36)
where, from (36), it follows that the rst-best e¤ort level is required for low-ability types and xN
 


=
xFBN
 


; whereas, from (35), it follows that kN   xN () < 0 whereby
xN () >
kN

= xFBN () :
In particular,
xN () =
kN (1  (UF ()  UN ()))
 (1  (UF ()  UN ()))  UN
 
    :
Notice that, combining the binding UIC for rm N with the negative selection of ability for rm N , one
gets
1
2
 
   x2N () = UN ()  UN   < UF ()  UF   :
Using (34), yields
xN () <
kFp

whereby, the following chain of inequalities, which ranks the optimal e¤ort levels, holds
xN
 


= xFBN
 


< xFBN () < x

N () <
kFp

<
kF

= xF () = x
FB
F () (37)
Furthermore, the rst-order conditions with respect to utilities are
@LN
@UN ()
=   (1  (UF ()  UN ())) + 
 
kNxN ()  12x2N ()  UN ()
  UN = 0 (38)
and
@LN
@UN()
=   (1  )  1   UF    UN  + (1  )  kNxN    12x2N    UN  + UN = 0 :
(39)
Substituting for xFBN
 


into (39) yields
UN
(1  ) =
 
1   UF    UN    k2N
2
  UN
 


; (40)
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whereby
UN
 


=
UN
2 (1  ) +
1
2

k2N
2
   1  UF   : (41)
The second term on the right hand side of the above expression is the same as the reaction function of rm
N at the benchmark contracts. Thus, expression 41 suggests that UN
 


is higher than at the benchmark
contracts, being UN > 0; and that it is positively related to UF
 


; whereby strategic complementarities
still exist. Indeed, substituting for UF
 


given by (34) and rearranging yields
UN
 


=
2UN
3 (1  ) +
1
3

k2N

+
k2F
2
  2

>
1
3

k2N

+
k2F
2
  2

= UBN
 


(see expression (16) in the main text). Considering again the reaction function of rm F given by UF
 


in (34), it is easy to see that an increase in UN
 


triggers an increase in UF
 


but the latter is of
second order with respect to the former. Hence, the di¤erence UF
 

  UN   = b   decreases with
respect to the benchmark.
Moreover, consider (38): one can rewrite it as
UN () =
1
2
(SN ()  (1  UF ()))  
U
N
2
;
where SN () = kNxN ()   12x2N (), which is suggestive of the strategic complementarity between
UN () and UF () and of the fact that UN () decreases with respect to the benchmark contract. Indeed,
substituting for UF
 


given by (34) and rearranging yields
UN () <
1
3

2SN () +
k2F
2
  2

;
where SN () is smaller than at the rst-best, because xN () > x
FB
N () : Comparing this inequality with
the same condition in the benchmark case, in which UN = 0 and xN () = x
FB
N (), it is easy to see that
UN () decreases with respect to the benchmark contracts since
UN () <
1
3

2SN () +
k2F
2
  2

<
1
3

k2N

+
k2F
2
  2

= UBN ()
Finally, UF (), which is the best reply to U

N () as in the benchmark case, also decreases when UN ()
decreases, but to a lesser extent. Therefore the di¤erence UF () UN () = b () increases with respect
to the benchmark case. In sum, the negative selection of ability into rm N is reinforced when ability is
the workersprivate information.
To conclude, substituting for conditions (34) and (40) into equations (35) and (38), and considering
the binding UIC for rm N , yields a system of two equations in two unknowns, namely xN () and
43
UN
 


; which is the following8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 (kN   xN ())

1  k2F4 + 12UN
 


+ 14
 
   x2N ()+
+(1  )     xN ()1  k2F4 + 32UN    k2N2  = 0
 

1  k2F4 + 12UN
 


+ 14
 
   x2N ()+   kNxN ()  UN    12x2N ()+
  (1  )

1  k2F
4
+ 32UN
 

  k2N
2

= 0
:
Such a system is hard to be solved analytically, because it encompasses a third degree polynomial in
xN () ; nonetheless, numeric solutions are quite easy to nd. As an example, consider the uniform
distribution of abilities, whereby  = 12 ; let kF = 2 and kN = 1 and assume that  =
3
2 : Then condition
(19) is satised and the solution is such that, for rm N , xN () = 1: 089 > x
FB
N () = 1 and x

N
 


=
xFBN
 


= 23 . Moreover, U

N
 


= 0:017094 and UN () = 0:313 57: For rm F instead x

F () = x
FB
F () =
2 and xF
 


= xFBF
 


= 43 ; with U

F
 


= 0:67521 and UF () = 1:1568: Then, the indi¤erent worker
with high ability has motivation b () = UF () UN () = 1:1568  0:31357 = 0:843 23, which is higher
than that of the indi¤erent worker with low-ability b   = UF     UN   = 0:67521   1:7094 
10 2 = 0:658 12; in line with negative selection of ability for rm N . Finally, wages paid by rm N are
wN () = 0:906 53 and w

N
 


= 0:350 43 whereas wages paid by rm F are given by wF () = 3:1568 and
wF
 


= 2:0085 with wi () > w

i
 


for i = N;F but also wF () wF
 


> wN () wN
 


: For the
sake of comparison, the benchmark contracts in this case would be characterized by UBN () =
1
3 > U

N ()
and UBN
 


= 0 < UN
 


for rm N and by UBF () =
7
6 = 1: 166 7 > U

F () and U
B
F
 


= 23 < U

F
 


for rm F; whereby bB () = 56 = 0:833 33 < b () and bB   = 23 > b   : Thus, with respect to the
benchmark case, for rm N the labor supply coming from low-ability workers goes down while the labor
supply coming from high-ability workers goes up. As for wages, we have wBN () =
5
6 = 0:833 33 < w

N ()
and wBN
 


= 13 < w

N
 


; whereas wBF () =
19
6 = 3: 166 7 > w

F () and w
B
F
 


= 2 < wF
 


; so that
all wages increase under asymmetric information about ability except for high-ability workers employed
by the for-prot rm. Finally, wF () wN () = 3:1568 0:906 53 = 2: 250 3 < wBF () wBN () = 196   56 =
7
3 = 2: 333 3 and w

F
 

   wN   = 2:0085   0:350 43 = 1: 658 1 < wBF     wBN   = 2   13 = 53 = 1:
666 7: So the non-prot wage penalty decreases for all types of workers with respect to the benchmark
contracts.
A.4 Necessity of Assumption 1
Before moving to the next case, notice that Assumption 1 in the main text is needed because, unless
the di¤erence in ability is su¢ ciently low that 2 >  holds, prots for rm N from type  are negative.
Indeed, consider
N () =

kNxN ()  1
2
x2N ()  UN ()

44
and substitute for
UN () = UN
 


+
1
2
 
   x2N ()
from the binding UIC: This yields
N () =

kNxN ()  1
2
x2N ()  UN
 


:
Since xN () > xFBN () and total surplus is decreasing in xN () ; it is true that
N () <

kNx
FB
N () 
1
2
xFBN ()
2   UN
 


=  
 
   2 k2N
2
  UN
 


The right-most term is strictly negative when   2 and hence a necessary condition for principal N
to make non-negative prots from the  type is that  < 2: The same conclusion, although referred to
either low-ability types or to the other rm, holds for all the cases that follow.
A.5 Negative selection: Optimal contracts when UIC binds for the non-prot
rm and DIC binds for the for-prot rm
Suppose that kF > kN . For rm N , UICN is binding while DICN is slack. Its program (PN), the
Lagrangian associated with it and the rst-order conditions are the same as in the preceding case.
Consider now the problem (PF ) of rm F under the constraint that DICF binds. The Lagrangian
associated with this problem is
LF = E (F ) + DF

UF ()  UF
 

  1
2
 
   x2F  
with the following rst-order conditions
@LF
@xF ()
=  (kF   xF ()) (UF ()  UN ()) = 0 ; (42)
@LF
@xF ()
= (1  )  kF   xF    UF    UN    DF     xF   = 0 ; (43)
@LF
@UF ()
=   (UF ()  UN ()) + 
 
kFxF ()  12x2F ()  UF ()

+ DF = 0 ; (44)
and, nally,
@LF
@UF ()
=   (1  )  UF    UN  + (1  )  kFxF    12x2F    UF    DF = 0 (45)
From (42) and (43) one gets xF () =
kF
 = x
FB
F () and x

F
 


< xFBF
 


: In particular, one could write
xF
 


=
(1  ) kF
 
UF
 

  UN  
(1  )   UF    UN  + DF      :
Notice that, combining the two binding incentive compatibility constraints, i.e. DICF and UICN , and
adding negative selection of ability for rm N , one gets
1
2
 
   x2F   = UF ()  UF   > UN ()  UN   = 12     x2N () :
45
For rm N , the solution solves the same equations as in the preceding Section A.5, whereby xN () >
xFBN () and x

N
 


= xFBN
 


: Thus, the following chain of inequalities holds with respect to optimal
e¤ort levels
xF () = x
FB
F () > x

F
 


> xN () > x

N
 


= xFBN
 


: (46)
As for utilities, from (44), substituting for xFBF () and solving for the Lagrange multiplier, one obtains
DF = 

(UF ()  UN ()) 

k2F
2
  UF ()

;
where, since DF > 0; it must be the case that
UF () >
1
2

k2F
2
+ UN ()

;
which hints at UF () being higher than in the benchmark case. Moreover, consider conditions (38) and
(44), equate and solve them for UF (), obtaining
UF () =
2
3
 
DF

+
k2F
2
+
1
2
SN () 
1
2
  
U
N
2
!
:
The same condition at the rst-best would be
UBF () =
2
3

k2F
2
+
1
2
SFBN () 
1
2

=
1
3

SFBN () +
k2F

  1

:
Then UF () > U
B
F () if and only if
2DF   UN


>
 
SFBN ()  SN ()

> 0;
a necessary condition being that 2DF > 
U
N : Moreover, take conditions (39) and (45), equate and solve
them for UF
 


, yielding
UF
 


=
2
3
 
SF
 

  DF
(1  ) +
UN
2 (1  ) +
k2N
4
  1
2
!
:
Comparing this information rent with the benchmark utility one gets that UF
 


> UBF
 


if and only if
UN   2DF

2 (1  ) > S
FB
F
 

  SF   > 0;
a necessary condition being that UN > 2
D
F : Therefore, one can conclude that U

F () > U
B
F () must be
true because rm F must leave an information rent to high-ability workers who can mimic low-ability
ones; this fact also implies that 2DF > 
U
N and that U

F
 


< UBF
 


must also holds true.
Analyzing now the selection e¤ects, take the analogue of condition (44) at the benchmark, i.e. with
DF = 0; substitute for x
FB
F () and solve for the rst-best total surplus as
SFBF () 
k2F
2
= 2UBF ()  UBN () :
46
Substituting for SFBF () into (44), and taking into account that 
D
F > 0 in this case, one obtains
2
 
UF ()  UBF ()
   UN ()  UBN () > 0: (47)
Considering condition (45) and repeating the same procedure, with the di¤erence that SF
 


< SFBF
 


;
one gets
UN
 

  UBN    2  UF    UBF   > 0 (48)
Moreover, considering the programme of rm N and applying the same reasoning to the rst-order
conditions (38) and (39) yields
UF ()  UBF ()  2
 
UN ()  UBN ()

> 0 (49)
and
2
 
UN
 

  UBN     UF    UBF   > 0; (50)
respectively. Finally, putting (47) and (49) together, and rearranging, yields
UF ()  UN () > UBF ()  UBN (), b () > bB ()
and similarly, putting (48) and (50) together, and rearranging, yields
UF
 

  UN   < UBF    UBN  , b   < bB   :
These results prove that the negative selection e¤ect for the non-prot rm is reinforced when there is
asymmetric information about workersability.
Finally, the complete system of equations characterizing the simultaneous solution to both rms
programmes consists of8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
   1  UF  + UN    12       x2F    x2N () (xN ()  kN )+
+ (1  )

1  UF
 


+ 2UN
 

  k2N
2
  
   xN () = 0
   1  UF  + UN    12       x2F    x2N ()+
+
 
kNxN ()  12x2N ()  UN
 

  (1  )1  UF  + 2UN    k2N2  = 0
(1  )  UF    UN    kF   xF  +
 
 
   x2F  + 2UF    12     x2N ()  UN    k2F2      xF   = 0
  (1  )  UF    UN  + (1  )  kFxF    12x2F    UF  
 
 
   x2F  + 2UF    12     x2N ()  UN    k2F2  = 0
where the relevant unknowns are xF
 


and xN () on the one hand and UF
 


and UN
 


on the other
hand.
As an example, consider the uniform distribution of abilities, whereby  = 12 ; let kF = 2 and kN = 1
and assume that  = 65 : Then condition (20) is satised and the solution is such that, for rm N ,
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xN () = 1: 093 2 > x
FB
N () = 1 and x

N
 


= xFBN
 


= 56 : Moreover, U

N
 


= 0:188 77 and UN () =
0:308 28: For rm F; instead, xF () = x
FB
F () = 2 and x

F
 


= 1: 649 2 < xFBF
 


= 53 with U

F
 


=
0:904 89 and UF () = 1: 176 9: Then, the indi¤erent worker with high ability has motivation equal tob () = UF () UN () = 1: 176 9  0:308 28 = 0:868 62 which is higher than that of low-ability workersb   = UF     UN   = 0:904 89   0:188 77 = 0:716 12; in line with negative selection of ability for
rm N . Finally, wages paid by rm N are wN () = 0:90582 and w

N
 


= 0:60544 whereas wage paid
by rm F are given by wF () = 3:1769 and w

F
 


= 2:5368 with wi () > w

i
 


for i = N;F but also
wF ()  wF
 


> wN ()  wN
 


:
Finally, let us compare these results with the benchmark contracts. In this case, UBN () =
1
3 >
UN () = 0:308 28 and U
B
N
 


= 16 < U

N
 


= 0:188 77; moreover UBF () =
7
6 = 1: 166 7 < U

F () = 1:
176 9 and UBF
 


= 1112 = 0:916 67 > U

F
 


= 0:904 89: Thus, bB () = UBF ()  UBN () = 76   13 = 56 =
0:833 33 < b () whereas bB   = UBF   UBN   = 1112  16 = 34 = 0:75 > b   so that, for rm N; the
labor supply from high-ability workers decreases while the labor supply from low-ability workers increases
with asymmetric information about skills. As for wages, we have wBN () =
5
6 = 0:833 33 < w

N () and
wBN
 


= 712 = 0:583 33 < w

N
 


; whereas wBF () =
19
6 = 3: 166 7 < w

F () and w
B
F
 


= 3112 =
2: 583 3 > wF
 


; so that all wages increase under asymmetric information about ability except for
low-ability workers employed by the for-prot rm. Finally, wF ()   wN () = 3:1769   0:90582 =
2: 271 1 < wBF ()   wBN () = 196   56 = 73 = 2: 333 3 and wF
 

   wN   = 2:5368   0:60544 = 1:
931 4 < wBF
 

 wBN   = 3112   712 = 2 So the non-prot wage penalty decreases for all types of workers
with respect to the benchmark contracts.
A.6 Positive selection: Optimal contracts when UIC binds for the for-prot
rm
Assume that kF < kN : Consider rm F and assume that UIC is binding while DIC is slack. Its program
is (PF ) subject to DIC and the Lagrangian associated with it is
LF = E (F ) + UF

UF
 

  UF () + 1
2
 
   x2F ()
with UF > 0 being the Lagrange multiplier associated with UICF : The rst-order conditions with respect
to e¤ort levels are
@LF
@xF ()
=  (kF   xF ()) (UF ()  UN ()) + UF
 
   xF () = 0
@LF
@xF ()
= (1  )  kF   xF    UF    UN   = 0
where, from the second line, one gets that the rst-best e¤ort level is required for low-ability types and
xF
 


= xFBF
 


; whereas from the rst line one has that
xF () >
kF

= xFBF () :
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In particular,
xF () =
kF (UF ()  UN ())
 (UF ()  UN ())  UF
 
    :
The rst-order conditions with respect to utilities are
@LF
@UF ()
=   (UF ()  UN ()) + 
 
kFxF ()  12x2F ()  UF ()
  UF = 0
@LF
@UF ()
=   (1  )  UF    UN  + (1  )  kFxF    12x2F    UF  + UF = 0 :
Substituting xFBF
 


into the second equation yields
UF = (1  )

UF
 

  UN    k2F
2
  UF
 


; (53)
whereby, because UF > 0;
UF
 


>
1
2

k2F
2
+ UN
 


: (54)
Consider now the problem of rm N . It is the same as in the benchmark case, therefore rm N solves
(PN) under no additional constraints, whereby the system of rst-order conditions to this problem is
@E(N )
@xN ()
=  (kN   xN ()) (1  (UF ()  UN ())) = 0
@E(N )
@xN()
= (1  )  kN   xN    1   UF    UN   = 0
@E(N )
@UN ()
=   (1  (UF ()  UN ())) + 
 
kNxN ()  12x2N ()  UN ()

= 0
@E(N )
@UN()
=   (1  )  1   UF    UN  + (1  )  kNxN    12x2N    UN   = 0
The rst two conditions yield rst-best e¤ort levels, whereby xF () =
kF
 = x
FB
F () for all  2

; 
	
:
The last two conditions can be rewritten substituting for optimal e¤ort levels in order to obtain
UN () =
1
2

k2N
2   1 + UF ()

and UN
 


= 12

k2N
2
  1 + UF
 


: (55)
Notice that, combining the binding UICF with the positive selection of ability for rm N , one gets
1
2
 
   x2F () = UF ()  UF   < UN ()  UN   :
Using (55), one gets
xF () <
kNp

whereby,the following chain of inequalities holds
xF
 


= xFBF
 


< xFBF () < x

F () <
kNp

<
kN

= xN () = x
FB
N () : (56)
Notice that xN
 


= xFBN
 


is missing from the above chain because its position cannot be determined
unambiguously. The e¤ort level xFBN
 


= kN

is surely lower than kNp

and surely higher than xFBF
 


:
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Moreover, xFBN
 


> xFBF () if and only if
 
 <
kN kF
kF
with kN kFkF >
k2N k2F
2k2N+k
2
F
and kN kFkF >
k2N k2F
3k2F
if
and only if 2kF > kN > kF :
Analyzing utilities and following the same logic as in Appendix A.3 it is possible to show that UF
 


>
UBF
 


which also implies that UN
 


> UBN
 


with UN
 


increasing less than UF
 


so that
b   = UF    UN   > UBF    UBN   = bB   :
Moreover, UF () < U
B
F () which also implies that U

N () < U
B
N () but with U

N () decreasing less than
UF () whereby b () = UF ()  UN () < UBF ()  UBN () = bB () :
This proves that asymmetric information about workers ability reinforces the positive selection e¤ect
due to rm F having a competitive advantage over rm N:
Substituting for conditions (55) and (53) into equations @LF@xF () = 0 and
@LF
@UF ()
= 0; and considering
UICF binding, yields a system of two equations in two unknowns xF () and UF
 


which is the following8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 (kF   xF ())

1
2UF
 


+ 14
 
   x2F ()  k2N4 + 12+
+(1  )

3
2UF
 

  k2N
4
+ 12   k
2
F
2
  
   xF () = 0
 

1
2UF
 


+ 14
 
   x2F ()  k2N4 + 12+   kFxF ()  UF    12x2F ()
  (1  )

3
2UF
 

  k2N
4
+ 12   k
2
F
2

= 0
As an example, consider the uniform distribution of abilities, whereby  = 12 ; let kF = 1 and kN =
p
2 and
assume that  = 54 and  = 1: Then condition (19) is satised and the solution is such that, for rm N ,
xN () = x
FB
N () =
p
2 = 1: 414 2 and xN
 


= xFBN
 


= 4
p
2
5 = 1: 131 4: Moreover U

N
 


= 0:001615
and UN () = 0:165 05: For rm F , instead, x

F () = 1: 0074 > x
FB
F () = 1 and xF
 


= xFBF
 


= 45 =
0:8 with xFBN
 


> xF () : Moreover, U

F
 


= 0:203 23 and UF () = 0:330 09: Then, the motivation of
the high-ability worker who is indi¤erent between rms is b () = UF () UN () = 0:330 09 0:165 05 =
0:165 04 which is lower than the motivation of the marginal worker with low-ability which is b   =
UF
 

   UN   = 0:203 23   0:001615 = 0:201 62 in line with positive selection of ability for rm
N . Finally wages paid by rm N rm are wN () = 1: 165 1 and w

N
 


= 0:801 62 whereas wages
paid by rm F are given by wF () = 0:837 52 and w

F
 


= 0:603 23 with wi () > wi
 


for each
i = N;F and wN () > wF () for each  2

; 
	
but also wN ()   wN
 


= 1: 165 1   0:801 62 =
0:363 48 > wF ()   wF
 


= 0:837 52   0:603 23 = 0:234 29: Then non-prot employees experience a
wage premium for all ability levels and also higher returns to ability. The wage premium for non-prot
workers arises from the di¤erence in e¤ort levels (rm N has a competitive advantage and thus sets higher
e¤ort levels) and it is partly o¤set by the compensating e¤ect of intrinsic motivation which keeps UF ()
higher than UN () for all  2

; 
	
: For the sake of comparison, the benchmark contracts in this case
would be characterized by UBN () =
1
6 = 0:166 67 > U

N () and U
B
N
 


= 0 < UN
 


for rm N and by
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UBF () =
1
3 > U

F () and U
B
F
 


= 15 < U

F
 


for rm F; whereby bB () = UBF () UBN () = 13   16 =
0:166 67 > b () and bB   = UBF     UBN   = 15 < b   : Thus, with respect to the benchmark
case, for rm N the labor supply coming from low-ability workers goes up while the labor supply coming
from high-ability workers goes down. As for wages, we have wBN () =
7
6 = 1: 166 7 > w

N () and
wBN
 


= 45 < w

N
 


; whereas wBF () =
5
6 = 0:833 33 < w

F () and w
B
F
 


= 35 = 0:6 < w

F
 


; so
that, with respect to the benchmark, all wages increase except for high-ability workers employed by the
non-prot rm. Finally, wN () wF () = 1: 165 1 0:837 52 = 0:327 58 < wBN () wBF () = 76  56 = 13 =
0:333 33 and wN
 

 wF   = 0:801 62  0:603 23 = 0:198 39 < wBN   wBF   = 45   35 = 15 = 0:2: So
the non-prot wage premium decreases for all types of workers with respect to the benchmark contracts.
A.7 Positive selection: Optimal contracts when UIC binds for the for-prot
rm and DIC binds for the non-prot rm
For rm F , UIC is binding while DIC is slack. Its program (PF ), the Lagrangian associated with it
and the rst-order conditions are the same as in the preceding case.
Consider now the problem (PN) of rm N under the constraint that DICN binds, that is
UN () = UN
 


+
1
2
 
   x2N   :
Then the Lagrangian associated with problem (PN) is
LN = E (N ) + DN

UN ()  UN
 

  1
2
 
   x2N  
with DN > 0 being the Lagrange multiplier associated with DICN : The rst-order conditions with respect
to e¤ort levels are
@LN
@xN ()
=  (kN   xN ()) (1  (UF ()  UN ())) = 0
@LN
@xN()
= (1  )  kN   xN    1   UF    UN    DN     xN   = 0 :
From the rst line, one gets that the rst-best e¤ort level is required for high-ability types and xN () =
xFBN () ; whereas from the second line one has that
xN
 


<
kN

= xFBN
 


;
In particular,
xN
 


=
(1  ) kN
 
1   UF    UN  
(1  )   1   UF    UN  + DN      :
Moreover, combining the two binding incentive compatibility constraints, i.e. DICN and UICF , and
adding the positive selection of ability into rm N , one gets
1
2
 
   x2N   = UN ()  UN   > UF ()  UF   = 12     x2F () :
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For rm F , the optimal allocation is such that xN () = x
FB
N () and x

N
 


< xFBN
 


: Thus the
following chain of inequalities holds with respect to optimal e¤ort levels
xN () = x
FB
N () > x
FB
N
 


> xN
 


> xF () > x
FB
F () > x

F
 


= xFBN
 


: (58)
The rst-order conditions with respect to utilities are
@LN
@UN ()
=   (1  (UF ()  UN ())) + 
 
kNxN ()  12x2N ()  UN ()

+ DN = 0
@LN
@UN()
=   (1  )  1   UF    UN  + (1  )  kNxN    12x2N    UN    DN = 0 :
Analyzing utilities and following the same logic as in Appendix A.5 it is possible to show that UN () >
UBN () whereas U

F () < U
B
F () and that U

F
 


> UBF
 


whereas UN
 


< UBN
 


: Thus, it also
happens that b () = UF ()  UN () < UBF ()  UBN () = bB ()
and that b   = UF    UN   > UBF    UBN   = bB  
whereby asymmetric information about workers ability reinforces the positive selection e¤ect due to
rm F having a competitive advantage over rm N: Finally, the system of equations to be solved is the
following @LN
@xN()
= 0, @LN
@UN()
= 0 for rm N and @LF@xF () = 0,
@LF
@UF ()
= 0 for rm F: Using UICF and
DICN binding, allows us to eliminate UF
 


and UN
 


; respectively, from the system thus yielding8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:

k2N
2   (1  UF () + 2UN ())  (1  )
 
1
2x
2
N
 

  12       x2N    x2F ()  kNxN   = 0
(1  )
 
   x2F ()  12     x2N  + k2F2 +
  (2UF ()  UN ()) + 
 
kFxF ()  12x2F ()

= 0 
 (kF   xF ()) +
 
   xF () (1  ) (UF ()  UN ())+
+
 
   xF () (1  )UF ()      x2F () + 12     x2N    k2F2  = 0
(1  )  kN   xN    1  UF () + UN ()  12       x2N    x2F ()+
      xN   1  UF () + 2UN ()  k2N2  = 0
to be solved for xF () and xN
 


and also for UF () and UN () :
As an example, consider the uniform distribution of abilities, whereby  = 12 ; let kF = 1 and kN =
p
2
and assume that  = 65 and  = 1: The solution is such that, for rm N , xN () = x
FB
N () =
p
2 = 1: 414 2
and xN
 


= 1: 177 5 < xFBN
 


=
p
2
6
5
= 1: 178 5: Moreover UN () = 0:166 53 and U

N
 


= 0:02787 9:
For rm F , instead, xF () = 1: 010 9 > x
FB
F () = 1 and x

F
 


= xFBF
 


= 56 = 0:833 33 with
xFBN
 


> xF () : Moreover, U

F () = 0:328 86 and U

F
 


= 0:226 67: Then, the motivation of the
high-ability worker who is indi¤erent between rms is b () = UF ()   UN () = 0:328 86   0:166 53 =
0:162 33 which is lower than the motivation of the marginal worker with low-ability which is b   =
52
UF
 

   UN   = 0:226 67   0:02787 9 = 0:198 79; in line with positive selection of ability for rm
N . Finally wages paid by rm N rm are wN () = 1:166 5 and w

N
 


= 0:859 78 whereas wages
paid by rm F are given by wF () = 0:839 82 and w

F
 


= 0:643 34 with wi () > w

i
 


for each
i = N;F and wN () > w

F () for each  2

; 
	
but also wN ()   wN
 


= 1:166 5   0:859 78 =
0:306 72 > wF ()   wF
 


= 0:839 82   0:643 34 = 0:196 48: Then, as in the previous case, non-prot
employees experience a wage premium for all ability levels and also higher returns to ability. The wage
premium for non-prot workers arises from the di¤erence in e¤ort levels (rm N has a competitive
advantage and thus sets higher e¤ort levels) and it is partly o¤set by the compensating e¤ect of intrinsic
motivation which keeps UF () higher than UN () for all  2

; 
	
: For the sake of comparison, the
benchmark contracts in this case would be characterized by UBN () =
1
6 = 0:166 67 > U

N () and
UBN
 


= 136 = 0:02777 8 < U

N
 


for rm N and by UBF () =
1
3 > U

F () and U
B
F
 


= 29 =
0:222 22 < UF
 


for rm F; whereby bB () = UBF ()   UBN () = 13   16 = 0:166 67 > b () andbB   = UBF   UBN   = 29   136 = 736 = 0:194 44 < b   : Thus, with respect to the benchmark case,
for rm N the labor supply coming from high-ability workers goes up while the labor supply coming from
low-ability workers goes down. As for wages, we have wBN () =
7
6 = 1: 166 7 > w

N () and w
B
N
 


= 3136 =
0:861 11 > wN
 


; whereas wBF () =
5
6 = 0:833 33 < w

F () and w
B
N
 


= 2336 = 0:638 89 < w

F
 


;
so that, with respect to the benchmark, wages increase for rm F while they decrease for rm N:under
asymmetric information about ability except for high-ability workers employed by the non-prot rm.
Finally, wN ()  wF () = 1:166 5  0:839 82 = 0:326 68 < wBN ()  wBF () = 76   56 = 13 = 0:333 33 and
wN
 

   wF   = 0:859 78   0:643 34 = 0:216 44 < wBN     wBF   = 3136   2336 = 29 = 0:222 22: So the
non-prot wage premium decreases for all types of workers with respect to the benchmark contracts.
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